Asean’s dance of near and far

When peace becomes a component inside a much larger geopolitical bundle, the bundle itself becomes a liability.

From Julia Roknifard

Geopolitics in the present transitional period, where the world is moving away from a unipolar structure into a multipolar one, requires careful long term considerations and sound strategic moves which leave a very narrow margin of error — especially in regions like Southeast Asia, currently caught up in great power rivalry between China and the US.

As has been highlighted repeatedly, the region and its key structure, Asean — which now counts 11-members — is a fast growing dynamic and resource rich zone that despite a plurality of political systems, from constitutional monarchies to communist and socialist states, have come together to protect their common interests.

Malaysia, which chaired the Asean grouping for the 2025 term, counts several key milestones, including welcoming Timor Leste to the grouping and mediating a peace agreement that put a stop to the short but consequential border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. However this latter achievement, brought about by the energetic efforts of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is facing a potential unravelling.

Asean centrality versus external pressures

Thailand’s suspension of its peace agreement with Cambodia is not simply a diplomatic setback. It is a stark warning to Asean about the dangers of outsourcing its security and political decision-making to outside powers. A peace process celebrated with much fanfare is at risk of unravelling, revealing weak foundations and exposing the deeper risks of allowing US political dynamics to shape Southeast Asia’s internal affairs.

The truce itself was presented as a historic breakthrough. At the Asean Summit, President Donald Trump positioned the deal as a personal triumph, reportedly insisting on an elaborate signing ceremony that excluded China and elevated Washington’s role. However, it was more a spectacle than substance as within weeks, Thailand froze its participation in the ceasefire after a landmine blast injured its soldiers.

The speed with which the agreement fractured shows how brittle externally driven peace can be when it is shaped around political theatre rather than regional ownership.

This fragility mirrors a broader pattern in Washington’s approach to Asean. The US foreign policy machinery increasingly resembles its own legislative process: confusing, overloaded, and shaped by interest groups rather than coherent strategy.

In US politics, “bus bills” or omnibus packages are notorious for packing dozens of unrelated measures into a single vote, often cramming in unrelated concessions or lobbyist-driven demands into must-pass legislation. The same logic appears to have influenced Washington’s behaviour at the Asean Summit.

Reports ahead of Trump’s visit suggested that the US insisted that for the Thai–Cambodia peace signing ceremony to proceed, several unrelated agreements were also to be sealed.

Deputy investment, trade and industry minister Liew Chin Tong later revealed that Malaysia felt boxed in, implying that Malaysia had little choice in the terms of its agreement on reciprocal trade with the US. Although he defended the deal’s safeguards, Liew made clear that Malaysia had been negotiating under pressure, and this sense of coercion has coloured perceptions across the region.

Thailand itself, along with other Asean members, faced similar pressure to sign critical minerals agreements, frameworks that risk entangling Asean economies in Washington’s strategic competition with China.

While Anwar has since spoken to Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet and his Thai counterpart Anutin Charnvirakul, and has gotten the pair to reaffirm their commitment to finding a peaceful resolution, the fragility of the situation cannot be denied. It also highlights how such efforts must be Asean-led, not propped up by external actors.

US-China rivalry headwinds

By tying an unrelated peace agreement ceremony to trade arrangements and resource-supply agreements, the US replicated its domestic habit of bundling incompatible issues into a single “package deal”. What might work as a legislative tactic in Washington produces poor diplomacy abroad. It forces governments into agreements that do not reflect local realities and are structurally incapable of surviving stress.

The suspension of the Thai-Cambodia deal should be understood through this lens. It was hastily assembled to satisfy US optics – not a stable framework built on regional trust. When peace becomes a component inside a much larger geopolitical bundle, the bundle itself becomes a liability. Asean states may have signed it under pressure, but they will hesitate to implement commitments that were never tailored to their needs or conditions on the ground.

The dangers of this approach have wider implications. Washington’s increasingly transactional methods risk exporting instability into the region. External influence is already complicating Asean’s ability to deal with the Myanmar crisis, where outside powers have prolonged its internal conflicts. Instead of turning to distant capitals that operate on electoral cycles and lobbying pressures, Asean should look to its immediate neighbours whose interests are directly tied to regional stability.

China and India, despite their complexities, have geographic, economic and security incentives to support a stable Southeast Asia. Working with them on conflict mediation, border management and humanitarian issues would produce outcomes more reflective of local realities.

Prosperity through the South China Sea

The same principle applies to the South China Sea. Asean’s default impulse has been to seek US naval backing to counter China, but this militarised framing traps the region inside the US-China competition.

A more pragmatic alternative would be for Asean, China and potentially India, Japan and South Korea to develop cooperative mechanisms to include joint exploration initiatives, shared fisheries management, coordinated anti-piracy patrols, and economic corridors that turn contested waters into zones of mutual benefit rather than confrontation. This would be a truly multilateral approach that benefits the wider region instead of a geopolitical pressure point to drive a wedge between Asean, China and other regional parties.

The warning of a tenuous Thai-Cambodia truce is not an isolated incident. It is part of a larger pattern that shows what happens when Asean allows itself to become the stage on which global powers act out their rivalries.

Asean must reclaim control of its own security environment. Stability will not come from grand ceremonies orchestrated for foreign leaders, nor from omnibus-style agreements crammed with unrelated obligations.

It will come from Asean agency, diplomacy and solidarity. A self-reliant region is entirely within reach but only if it stops outsourcing its future and shapes it on its own terms. - FMT

Julia Roknifard is a senior lecturer at the School of Law and Governance at Taylor’s University and lectures at the newly launched programme “Philosophy, Politics, and Economics” (PPE).

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.