Anwar’s deficits: Madani govt assessment Part 2

From the onset, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Madani government inherited one of the most difficult conditions to govern Malaysia in her history.

Without an electoral mandate in a deeply politically polarised country, after the pandemic crisis in a country in need of recovery, without the same level of available funds of earlier governments, and with high expectations for results - inevitably, there would be gaps for any leader who took the helm.

In this second piece, the focus is on key deficits that the Madani government faces as a result of its (in)actions or decisions. The aim of raising these is to engender a discussion to address governance weaknesses.

Deficit of trust

Anwar entered and was socialised into politics in a different era, one in which leaders were believed and trusted. Ironically, it was his trauma of the 1997-1998 Reformasi period that helped break this mould.

His challenge of Dr Mahathir Mohamad at the time, and the onslaught response to demonise him, has left an imprint across generations.

Today, his core supporters put him on a pedestal, but those within the civil service and in large parts of society have a hard time trusting him. They even call him a chameleon.

In part, this has to do with his past involvement in politics, both in the Mahathir 1.0 era and later tied to his undelivered promises to be a “reformer”.

The deficit ranges from Sabahans who remember his role in Project IC and to religious authorities who resented his decision to join Umno rather than PAS in the early 1980s to traditional Pakatan Harapan voters today who have a hard time reckoning his past promises with current inaction to reform.

Not only has the Madani government failed to show strong commitment to political reform through substantive legislation and end political appointees (the new Suhakam chairperson Mohd Hishamudin Yunus is an exception), it has engaged in backsliding in areas such as the citizenship commitments to mothers, anti-hopping law, media freedom, and corruption.

Trust among Anwar’s Harapan political base is eroding. Hope is dissipating. Once trust is broken, it is hard to win it back; where conditions are at now, it will require significant reform deliverables to win back confidence.

Measures such as the two-term limit for the prime minister, political financing, and advance voting offer viable traction to undercut eroding trust. Reforms cannot be just through legislation, there needs to be changes in governance.

Deficit of communication

The Madani government suffers from the same deficit the 2018-2020 Harapan government did. It does not control the political narrative and poorly manages communication. It has worsened, with the government turning to more regulations and administrative measures.

Rather than have a cacophony of voices on issues, the Madani government has put Anwar in the spotlight. With declining trust in Anwar, the effect has been a weakening of confidence in the government as a whole.

At the same time, the positive initiatives of many ministers in the Madani government are being overshadowed, relegated to brief articles of a few lines. It is no wonder the public cannot identify concrete deliverables of the government.

Instead, attention focuses on disparaging and hurtful comments by ministers towards the “stupid” public. Public ridicule has no place in governance. Even in the days when Mahathir criticised the Malay community, the discourse never reached as low and inappropriate a level.

Arrogant responses have created an image of the Madani government as non-Madani - disdainful and lacking empathy and respect for the public. The government comes off as overly sensitive, even more than the days of BN.

Deficit of second-tier leadership

It is clear that some of the ministers in the Madani government have underperformed and not strengthened the government’s standing. Among these, there are two types:

1) Those who are in minister positions due to their party positions. They spend their time travelling and enjoying their positions.

2) Others do not have the experience, background, or character to manage their portfolios. For too many, there is a pattern of doing the minimum.

Many of the hard-working ministers are being overlooked as they opt less for the limelight than for results.

While the modest cabinet reshuffle in December did improve the Madani government’s performance – especially in finance and health – there remains a need to improve governance.

In June, there was another call for a reshuffle, signalling dissatisfaction. This matter needs serious consideration if the government is to achieve concrete deliverables and, importantly, strengthen governance moving forward.

Areas of education, national unity, and food security are structural problems that need more concerted programmes and initiatives that should extend beyond the purview of one ministry. Greater technical expertise is needed in these areas.

One of the most serious mistakes the Mahathir 2.0 Harapan government made was to assume they had time. The pace of outcomes of the current Madani government leaves them vulnerable to an inability to have lasting results.

The assumption of time also curtails a willingness to address the critical question of who should lead after Anwar. All of Malaysia’s political parties have a second-tier leadership deficit, with narrow and limited options.

There needs to be more space for younger leaders to grow and gain experience. The focus on the right now needs to be more attuned to the future.

Deficit of public support

Electorally, many in the Madani government are eyeing a second term in government. This is premature. The federal government has lost ground in every election that has been held since it took office in November 2022, including in the seats it managed to retain, such as Kuala Kubu Baharu.

The obsession of the government to win over the base they clearly cannot win at this juncture – the Malays – is now having backfiring electoral consequences, contributing to a loss of support among non-Malays largely through not voting. Last month’s Sungai Bakap election is illustrative.

The roots of Anwar’s lack of support among Malays are complex: it is tied to the demonisation of Reformasi and liberal ideas, the rejection of him among religious conservatives who see him as not representing the faith (while ironically non-Muslims see him as advocating a conservative Islamist agenda), anger at the alliances with DAP and, in some cases, Umno, and, importantly, for younger Malay voters, an inadequacy of his government to address everyday concerns of jobs, wages, cost of living, and education, especially for those under 35 years old.

The more the Anwar government courts Malays, the more it is being rejected.

Even the appeal to civil servants through salary increments and bonuses has done little to substantively change support patterns.

It also speaks to a persistent and parallel problem of the Mahathir 2.0 Harapan government - a lack of cooperation in policy implementation. This is a serious and understated obstacle in Madani governance.

The tactic has been – if the citizenship amendments are illustrative – to adopt policies advocated by the conservative deep state rather than win support for alternatives. This feeds perceptions that Anwar’s government has abandoned reform and is not reaching its potential.

A vicious cycle

A vicious reinforcing cycle of distrust, poor communication, underperforming second-tier leaders, and erosion of electoral support has emerged. It was a similar negative dynamic that contributed to divisions and created paralysis in the Mahathir 2.0 Harapan government. Lessons are not being learned.

Anwar’s Madani government deficits are not unsolvable if the problems are recognised and there is political will and innovation to address them.

Now a third of the way into a five-year term, there is a window to focus on deliverables – in the economy and in governance – before facing state elections in Sabah and Sarawak. Conditions are not easy with a higher cost of living, but the political space is an opportunity.

The question is whether Anwar’s government is willing to take a hard look and address the weaknesses. If it doesn’t, then this is the biggest deficit of all. - Mkini

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BRIDGET WELSH is an honourary research associate of the University of Nottingham’s Asia Research Institute, a senior research associate at Hu Fu Center for East Asia Democratic Studies, and a senior associate fellow at The Habibie Centre. Her writings can be found at bridgetwelsh.com.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT.