International order will be rudderless, not dead

By turning inwards, the US has paved the way for China to take on a more prominent role in global affairs.

The international order is not collapsing in the dramatic fashion often predicted. It is, however, increasingly rudderless.

The post-1945 system has not been dismantled, but its sense of direction, predictability, and moral coherence has weakened markedly under President Donald Trump’s inward turn.

What the world is witnessing is not the death of order, but the erosion of leadership.

In this strategic drift, China has not merely reacted — it has advanced.

A recent assessment by a Chinese scholar, reported in the South China Morning Post, captures this shift succinctly: America’s inward-looking posture has created “objective conditions” for China’s development.

This is not a triumphalist claim. It is a structural observation.

When the system’s traditional steward retreats into transactionalism and unpredictability, space opens for others to consolidate.

Yet to describe this moment as the “death” of the international order would be analytically sloppy.

Orders do not die easily. They fray, bend, fragment — and sometimes endure in weakened but recognisable forms.

Retreat without abdication

Trump’s “America First” doctrine does not amount to a full abdication of American power.

The US remains militarily preponderant, technologically formidable, and financially dominant. What has changed is not capability, but intent and consistency.

Under Trump, alliances are treated less as strategic investments and more as commercial contracts. Institutions are valued instrumentally rather than normatively.

While Washington has withdrawn from or downgraded its engagement with several UN agencies, countries such as China and Japan continue to place faith in multilateral frameworks.

This selective engagement has injected uncertainty into global governance. Allies and adversaries alike are probing what is permissible.

Canada believes it can pursue trade engagement with China despite threats of punitive tariffs from Washington. India and the European Union have concluded their largest trade agreement.

Europe, meanwhile, has been reminded by Nato’s leadership that it cannot replace America’s nuclear umbrella against Russia.

Crucially, this inward turn has not been accompanied by a coherent alternative vision.

The liberal international order once claimed universality, however imperfectly implemented. Trumpism offers no comparable organising principle beyond national advantage and leader-centric deal-making.

The result is not a vacuum, but drift.

China’s structural opportunity 

China did not create this opening; it exploited it.

Beijing’s response to US unpredictability has been methodical rather than impulsive.

Rather than confront Washington across all fronts, China has prioritised domestic consolidation, technological upgrading, supply-chain resilience, and institutional presence. President Xi Jinping has signalled his desire to meet Trump in April 2026, even as both sides recognise that the tariff truce expires in November the same year.

China has doubled down on industrial policy, long-term planning, and strategic patience. It has sought influence not by dismantling existing institutions wholesale, but by working around them through parallel mechanisms and alternative platforms.

This is why China’s rise during this period should not be misunderstood as purely ideological or revisionist.

Much of it reflects pragmatic adaptation to an environment in which the system’s leading power appears distracted by internal politics and grievance.

When the referee stops enforcing rules consistently, disciplined players gain an advantage.

A world without a compass 

What is emerging is neither a Cold War-style bipolarity nor a clean multipolar equilibrium.

Instead, the system is becoming asymmetrically fragmented.

The US appears to favour a uni-multipolar arrangement — dominating some domains while relegating others to China or Russia.

This selective leadership is evident.

Washington is no longer pressing North Korea aggressively on its nuclear programme, effectively leaving Beijing to manage Pyongyang’s escalation amid Kim Jong Un’s growing ties with Vladimir Putin.

Rules still exist, but enforcement is uneven. Institutions remain, but legitimacy is contested. Power is distributed, but leadership is situational. This is what a rudderless order looks like.

Such a system is especially uncomfortable for middle and small states. Stability depends not only on power balances, but on predictability.

When norms are selectively applied and commitments are negotiable, risk premiums rise across diplomacy, trade, and security.

For Asean and other trade-dependent regions, this uncertainty is costly.

It complicates hedging strategies, weakens multilateral dispute resolution, and increases the temptation for major powers to coerce rather than persuade.

Why the order is not dead 

Despite these stresses, the international order endures because its foundations run deeper than any single administration.

Global trade networks continue to function.

The US dollar remains the anchor for commodities ranging from oil to gold, even as some countries — including Malaysia — experiment with limited use of the renminbi. International law continues to be invoked, even when violated.

Multilateral institutions still shape expectations, even when ignored.

Norms retain power precisely because states continue to argue about them.

Even Trump’s America has not exited the system it once built.

It has contested it rhetorically, bypassed it tactically, and used it selectively — but not replaced it.

China, for all its growing influence, has also not articulated a comprehensive replacement order.

It benefits from existing structures even as it critiques their Western bias. Its strategy remains one of reform, insulation, and selective innovation rather than revolutionary overthrow.

The danger ahead

The real danger is not collapse, but miscalculation.

A rudderless system is prone to overreach and escalation.

Renewed US naval deployments in the Persian Gulf, warnings to Iran, and episodic coercive threats elsewhere illustrate how easily crises multiply without shared red lines.

For the US, continued inwardness risks turning strategic advantage into reputational erosion.

For China, overconfidence risks provoking containment before alternatives are fully viable.

For the rest of the world, survival with agency — rather than illusions of neutrality — becomes imperative.

Conclusion 

The international order is not dead. It is adrift.

America’s inward turn has loosened the system’s bearings, and China has advanced into the space created — cautiously, strategically, and without claiming stewardship.

What lies ahead is prolonged ambiguity rather than clean transition. In such a world, navigation matters more than destination. - FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.