
THE recent incidents in Singapore and Thailand should force Malaysia to seriously reconsider any move to weaken specialised counter-terrorism capabilities within the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM).
At a time when threats are becoming more unpredictable, the question is not whether Malaysia can afford to maintain dedicated counter-terrorism expertise. The real question is whether Malaysia can afford the consequences of losing it.
National security failures are rarely caused by a complete lack of warnings. More often, they occur because warnings are missed, intelligence capabilities are weakened or institutions lack the expertise to act in time.
Counter-terrorism is not conventional policing. It requires specialised intelligence analysis, threat assessment, behavioural understanding, cyber monitoring, international cooperation and years of operational experience.
The recent case in Singapore demonstrates why prevention remains the most important element of counter-terrorism.
In July, Singapore detained three self-radicalised youths aged between 14 and 19 after authorities discovered separate plans to carry out violent attacks.
One of them, a 14-year-old student, had prepared a 21-page manifesto outlining a planned mass-casualty stabbing at his school. He was detained before the planned attack could take place.
This incident represents the changing face of terrorism. The traditional understanding often involved organised groups, trained operatives and physical networks.
However, the Singapore case demonstrates that radicalisation can now occur individually through online platforms, extremist content and digital communities.

A young person without direct contact with a terrorist organisation can still develop the motivation and potentially the capability to commit mass violence.
The success of Singapore’s Internal Security Department was not measured by arrests after bloodshed occurred. It was measured by prevention. The attack never happened because intelligence, monitoring and early intervention worked.
This is the essence of modern counter-terrorism: identifying threats before they become tragedies.
Malaysia must understand this changing threat landscape. Violent extremism today does not always announce itself through organised cells, bombings or foreign terrorist fighters.
It may emerge through online radicalisation, lone actors, extremist propaganda or individuals influenced by violent ideologies.
The recent shooting at Debsirin Nonthaburi School in Thailand provides another regional warning, although it should not be characterised as terrorism.
A 14-year-old student killed his grandparents before opening fire at the school near Bangkok, killing and injuring students and staff. The death toll later rose to nine.
The Thailand incident demonstrates another dimension of modern security challenges. While not every violent act is terrorism, the ability to identify warning signs, assess threats and coordinate rapid responses remains essential to public safety.
This is precisely why Malaysia cannot afford to view counter-terrorism merely through the traditional lens of bombings, militant groups or foreign terrorist fighters.
The security environment has evolved. Threats can emerge from cyberspace, social media platforms and increasingly unpredictable individuals.
Any move to downsize or dismantle specialised counter-terrorism capabilities within PDRM must therefore be carefully questioned.
A counter-terrorism unit is not simply another administrative division that can be merged, reduced or eliminated to achieve organisational efficiency.

It represents accumulated institutional knowledge built through years of intelligence operations, regional cooperation and lessons learned from previous security threats.
Malaysia has already demonstrated the value of maintaining such expertise. PDRM’s Special Branch Counter Terrorism Division, known as E8, has foiled 26 attempted terrorist and militant attacks between 2012 and 2024, according to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police.
During the same period, the division detained 75 individuals linked to militant and terrorist activities who were planning attacks.
These successes are easy to overlook precisely because the attacks did not happen.
That is the paradox of preventive security. When intelligence works, there may be no explosion, no mass casualty incident and no dramatic headline. The public sees nothing.
But that does not mean nothing happened.
Once specialised expertise is lost, rebuilding it during a crisis is almost impossible. Experienced officers cannot be created instantly. Intelligence networks cannot be rebuilt overnight. Trust between agencies and international partners requires years of cooperation.
Malaysia’s geographical and strategic position makes this capability particularly important. Southeast Asia has experienced terrorist networks, extremist movements, foreign fighter flows and terrorist financing activities.
Malaysia has previously demonstrated its ability to disrupt extremist plots through intelligence and enforcement operations. Maintaining that capability is not a sign of weakness. It is a reflection of responsible governance.
The argument that resources should be redirected elsewhere must also be carefully examined. National security should not be measured only through financial expenditure.
The purpose of security institutions is to prevent disasters that may never occur. Their success is often invisible because the attacks they prevent never become headlines.

Governments must be cautious about applying ordinary bureaucratic logic to extraordinary security challenges.
Reducing specialised counter-terrorism capability may produce short-term administrative savings, but the potential cost of failure could involve lives, public confidence and national stability.
Malaysia’s peace has never been accidental. It has been protected through strong institutions, intelligence cooperation and effective law enforcement. The country’s security environment today demands greater vigilance, not reduced capability.
The lessons from Singapore are clear: early detection and specialised intervention can prevent young individuals from carrying out devastating attacks.
The lesson from Thailand is equally important: catastrophic violence can emerge suddenly in places considered safe, even when it is not terrorism.
Before weakening specialised counter-terrorism capabilities, policymakers must ask a fundamental question: are short-term savings more valuable than long-term national security?
The answer should be obvious.
Counter-terrorism cannot be treated as an ordinary administrative function that can simply be reduced whenever the immediate threat appears to have receded.
The specialised capabilities within PDRM must be preserved, strengthened and modernised because the foremost responsibility of any government is not merely administrative efficiency, but the protection of the lives, safety and security of its people.
R. Paneir Selvam is Principal Consultant at Arunachala Research & Consultancy Sdn Bhd (ARRESCON), a think tank specialising in strategic and geopolitical analysis.
The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.
- Focus Malaysia.






