From haze to action: Why Malaysia must invest in public support for science

 

WHEN the air becomes difficult to breathe and outdoor activities have to be cancelled, science suddenly becomes very real.

Parents worry about health. Businesses worry about productivity. Schools worry. People check the Air Pollutant Index (API), look for face masks and ask when the haze will clear.

Yet when scientists warn about climate change, the public response is often less immediate. The threats may be enormous, but they can seem distant, abstract and disconnected from everyday life.

This contrast presents Malaysia with an important opportunity: can we turn public concern over haze into a lasting commitment to science?

Climate change is a global concern whose consequences unfold over decades. Although its effects are already being experienced in many countries, the connection between an individual action today and a climatic consequence tomorrow is not always obvious.

Haze is different. It is visible, tangible and disruptive. It brings the consequences of environmental problems directly into people’s homes, workplaces and lungs.

(Image: AFP)

Scientific research has documented the health and economic implications of haze in Malaysia. The Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM), for example, has examined its causes and potential solutions through its Local and Transboundary Haze Study.

The study covers air quality and haze episodes, peatland and water management, and the conversion of waste biomass into energy and materials.

Its recommendations demonstrate that haze is not merely an environmental inconvenience, but a complex problem requiring scientific, economic and social solutions.

The public may not immediately appreciate the value of atmospheric modelling, satellite observations, epidemiological studies or research into land management.

But when these scientific capabilities help explain where pollution comes from, identify health risks and improve forecasts, their value becomes much easier to understand.

The challenge is not simply to communicate science more effectively during a haze episode. It is to use that episode to demonstrate why a scientifically informed society is better equipped to confront problems before they become crises.

In Malaysia, much of the financial responsibility for scientific research rests with the government and publicly funded institutions. Such support remains indispensable.

Basic research, long-term environmental monitoring and investigations whose benefits cannot be easily commercialised are unlikely to receive sufficient private investment without public funding.

However, should the government be expected to shoulder almost the entire burden of advancing science?

Science contributes to public health, industrial competitiveness, food security, environmental resilience and national prosperity. Its benefits extend well beyond universities and laboratories.

Businesses use scientific discoveries to develop products and improve processes, while communities benefit from better knowledge, technologies and public services.

It follows that responsibility for supporting science should be shared more widely.

The private sector can contribute through research partnerships, corporate donations, endowed research chairs, scholarships, innovation funds and support for scientific institutions.

Businesses whose operations depend on natural resources, energy, agriculture, healthcare and manufacturing have particular reasons to invest in scientific knowledge.

Corporate participation, however, should not be limited to funding research that promises immediate commercial returns.

Companies can also support independent research into public-interest questions, including environmental risks, occupational health and the long-term sustainability of their industries.

The public, too, can participate. Individual contributions may be small, but collective support can help finance research, science education, citizen-science initiatives and the communication of scientific findings.

The objective is not to replace government funding with private money. It is to build a broader ecosystem in which public investment is complemented by private-sector commitment and public participation.

There is, however, an important qualification. People cannot reasonably be expected to support science simply because they are told it is important. They must be able to see what their contributions achieve.

(Image: UNICEF)

Scientific institutions need to explain their work in accessible language, demonstrate its relevance to society and communicate both successes and uncertainties honestly.

They must also show how research contributes to better decisions, new technologies and improvements in people’s lives.

The haze offers a natural starting point. Imagine a national initiative in which government, industry, universities and communities work together to explain the science of air pollution: how particulate matter affects health, how satellites detect fires, how weather conditions influence pollution and how researchers distinguish local pollution sources from transboundary smoke.

Companies could sponsor independent research, support public monitoring initiatives and help develop pollution prevention and detection technologies.

Universities could open their laboratories to the public and invite researchers to explain their findings. Schools could use local air-quality data to introduce students to environmental science.

The initiative should not disappear when the skies clear.

Haze is the immediate concern; the larger objective is to cultivate a society that understands and values scientific inquiry, even when the problems being investigated are less visible. 

The author, Professor Datuk Dr Ahmad Ibrahim is affiliated with the Tan Sri Omar Centre for STI Policy Studies at UCSI University and is an Adjunct Professor at the Ungku Aziz Centre for Development Studies, Universiti Malaya.

The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of  MMKtT

- Focus Malaysia.

Waze ban must be the start of a wider digital security strategy

 

CAN a navigation application become a national security liability?

Malaysia’s decision to restrict civil servants’ use of Waze has brought an increasingly urgent question into public debate: who controls the digital information generated by technologies that governments and citizens use every day?

The concern is not simply about maps or directions. It is about data ownership, foreign legal jurisdiction and the possibility that information collected for commercial purposes could acquire strategic value.

Malaysia should treat the Waze controversy as an opportunity to build a coherent digital security policy, rather than regard an application ban as an end in itself.

When ordinary data becomes strategic

(Image: Pexels/Erik McLean)

Waze relies on location information and user contributions to provide navigation and real-time traffic updates. While such information is useful for identifying congestion, repeated movement patterns may also reveal routines around government offices, security installations and critical infrastructure.

The wider implications were illustrated by a South China Morning Post report published in May 2026.

Citing testimony before a US congressional advisory commission, it described concerns that large-scale data collection could support intelligence gathering, economic competition and military planning.

The underlying lesson is that information collected for one purpose may acquire a different strategic value when aggregated and analysed.

This does not establish that Waze has been used for espionage. Indeed, Waze has rejected allegations that it collects sensitive government information or allows the exploitation of users’ personal data.

Malaysia must distinguish between a credible vulnerability, a potential threat and proven misconduct.

Nevertheless, governments cannot wait for a security breach before examining risks involving sensitive official activities.

The jurisdiction question

Malaysia’s National Cyber Security Agency (NACSA) has identified the application’s data collection practices and Israeli governing-law and jurisdiction clauses as concerns.

Such provisions raise legitimate questions about where disputes would be resolved and what practical remedies might be available to Malaysian users.

However, foreign jurisdiction alone does not prove that a company’s government can freely access all the information it processes.

The more useful questions are what information is collected, where it is processed, which parties can access it, how long it is retained and what legal safeguards apply.

The distinction matters because digital sovereignty cannot be measured simply by the nationality of a technology provider. It depends on whether Malaysia can establish enforceable protections over information relevant to its national interests.

What Malaysia should do

First, the government should clarify the scope of the Waze directive. Official communications have not been entirely consistent: the initial directive was described as applying to official government duties, while NACSA’s published FAQ states that the restriction applies to civil servants at all times, including personal use.

Clear and consistent guidance is essential for compliance, proportionality and public confidence.

Second, NACSA should coordinate a formal assessment framework for digital applications used in government.

Assessments should examine data permissions, overseas processing, third-party sharing, retention policies, contractual jurisdiction and the consequences of a potential compromise.

Applications used by personnel handling classified information should face more stringent requirements than those used for routine administrative tasks.

Third, Malaysia should establish a government-wide register of approved digital applications, supported by periodic independent security audits.

Agencies should have clear procedures for restricting high-risk services, reporting vulnerabilities and responding to suspected breaches.

Procurement contracts should provide enforceable protections for government information and require providers to disclose significant security incidents.

Fourth, Malaysia should strengthen its domestic digital alternatives without assuming that local ownership guarantees security.

TuJu, developed by the Malaysian Highway Authority in collaboration with Prosignal Consortium Sdn Bhd, could form part of the national response.

However, its reliability, privacy safeguards, technical resilience and ability to meet users’ needs must be independently assessed. A replacement that performs poorly may discourage adoption and undermine the policy’s objectives.

Finally, the government should apply consistent standards across digital services, including navigation platforms, cloud systems and other applications that process sensitive information.

Restrictions should be based on demonstrable risks, with clear criteria, periodic review and appropriate oversight. Otherwise, security policy risks becoming selective and difficult to defend.

From prohibition to preparedness

(Image: Harian Metro)

Malaysia’s position on Palestine and its broader foreign policy may shape how it evaluates relationships with foreign entities. Yet national cybersecurity requires a framework capable of distinguishing political considerations from technical evidence and legal risk.

The Waze controversy should therefore trigger a broader examination of how government agencies manage digital dependencies.

The objective is not to reject foreign technology indiscriminately, but to ensure that its use does not compromise sensitive operations or leave Malaysia without effective remedies.

A ban can reduce exposure to a particular service, but it cannot substitute for institutional preparedness.

Malaysia must move from reacting to individual applications towards a digital security regime built on independent assessment, enforceable safeguards and consistent accountability.

Sovereignty in the digital age is not merely the freedom to prohibit a technology; it is the capacity to understand, govern and protect the information on which national security depends. 

R Paneir Selvam is Principal Consultant at Arunachala Research & Consultancy Sdn Bhd (ARRESCON), a think tank specialising in strategic national and geopolitical analysis.

The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of  MMKtT

- Focus Malaysia.