‘Suo motu’ faster way to resolving Negeri Sembilan impasse

 Adopting such an approach would be better compared to an emergency proclamation or setting up a tribunal.

Proclaiming an emergency or setting up a tribunal to resolve the Negeri Sembilan constitutional crisis is an unconstitutional route to bypass a deadlock, given that the Federal Court possesses the immediate, inherent, constitutional judicial power to resolve such a crisis through “suo motu” (on its own motion) orders and directions.

Under the Federal Constitution, the royal institution (Malay rulers) lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional disputes or matters of constitutional misconduct.

Currently, the only available pathway is a judicial review.

Unfortunately, this mechanism is inherently unsuited for urgent constitutional crises because it requires litigants to exhaust lengthy appeals through the High Court and Court of Appeal before reaching the Federal Court.

To bypass these systemic delays, the Federal Court must exercise “suo motu” to deliver swift, definitive rulings.

While Article 34 of the Negeri Sembilan Constitution permits the ruler to refer constitutional questions directly to the apex court, this mechanism is constrained: the ruler cannot initiate this reference independently without the executive advice.

Furthermore, standard constitutional references remain bogged down by the slow, adversarial nature of legal procedures.

In contrast, a “suo motu” intervention acts as an inquisitorial review activated by Oath of Office jurisprudence.

This grants judges the legitimate constitutional power to act immediately in the interest of constitutional justice and the rule of law itself.

The ongoing constitutional dispute within the Negeri Sembilan royalty – pitting the customary powers of the chieftains (undangs) against the state’s council of the Yang Dipertuan Besar as well as state actors and politicians – presents a severe, unprecedented threat to the nation’s rule of law.

Left unaddressed, it risks fracturing the state’s constitutional machinery, as well as respect for the Malay rulers in line with the Rukun Negara.

In navigating this constitutional crisis, the two heavily discussed political manoeuvres are emergency proclamation, or setting up an ad hoc tribunal.

In my view, both must be firmly rejected as unconstitutional, counterproductive shortcuts which will result in delay, thereby threatening national security as well as the constitutional mandate.

Under the Federal Constitution, the royal institution lacks the inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate its own constitutional disputes or police cases of constitutional misconduct.

The state’s elected executive is equally powerless to settle the matter via administrative decree.

Concurrently, relying on standard legal mechanisms will prove fatal to a swift resolution:

The judicial review trap

The standard judicial review pathway is inherently unsuited for fast-moving constitutional crises.

Litigants are forced to exhaust months or years of grinding, multi-tiered appeals through the High Court and Court of Appeal before finally placing the matter before the apex court.

The limitations of Article 34

While Article 34 of the Laws of the Constitution of Negeri Sembilan 1959 permits a constitutional question to be referred to the Federal Court, the mechanism is severely bottlenecked.

The state ruler cannot act independently under this provision; he remains constrained by executive advice.

The adversarial delay

Even if a formal reference is successfully triggered, it remains bogged down by slow, traditional adversarial procedures.

The state cannot afford the luxury of prolonged, litigious delays while its governance hangs in the balance.

The solution: judicial power and ‘suo motu’ intervention.

To bypass these systemic paralyses, the Federal Court must rise to its constitutional stature by exercising its inherent “suo motu” jurisdiction – the power to act on its own motion or initiative.

The Oath of Office mandate

As consistently advocated, a judge’s constitutional Oath of Office – to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Federal Constitution – is not a passive, ceremonial formality.

It is a proactive legal shield. When the constitutional framework is embarrassed or undermined by an arbitrary exercise of power, the superior courts have an instant right and an absolute constitutional duty to intervene.

Inquisitorial power over adversarial delay

By invoking Constitutional Judicial Power (derived dynamically from Article 121(1) read alongside the judicial oath), the apex court can transition from a passive adversarial arbiter into an inquisitorial review body.

This gives the Federal Court the legitimate authority to issue immediate, fast-tracked “suo motu” orders and directions directly to the parties involved.

Instantaneous resolution

Rather than waiting for a political consensus or allowing a gridlocked legal system to run its agonising course, a “suo motu” intervention cuts through the procedural red tape.

It allows the apex court to take instant judicial notice of the impasse, summon the necessary parties, and deliver a definitive, binding ruling in the supreme public interest.

Conclusion

The Federal Court does not need to hide behind doctrines of judicial restraint when the bedrock of constitutional governance is at risk.

The attorney-general, as the guardian of public interest, should immediately petition the apex court to trigger this fast-track mechanism.

By exercising judicial dynamism rather than acting as a passive observer, watching the unprecedented sordid constitutional theatrical; the Federal Court can resolve the Negeri Sembilan crisis instantly, restoring absolute clarity and preserving national harmony.- FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.