National stability essential for regional strategic coherence

 Malaysia’s liquid political situation can have a negative impact on Asean centrality.

Asean centrality can be weakened by the increasingly liquid political situation in Malaysia, especially at a time when Southeast Asia requires greater strategic coherence.

Asean centrality is not merely a diplomatic slogan.

It refers to the bloc’s ability to remain at the centre of the regional architecture, bringing major powers into Asean-led mechanisms while preventing Southeast Asia from becoming merely an arena for their competition.

This requires Asean member states themselves to possess sufficient political stability, diplomatic consistency and institutional capacity.

Malaysia matters enormously in this process.

As one of Asean’s five founding members, Malaysia has traditionally possessed diplomatic reach beyond its material size. Its geography places it between continental and maritime Southeast Asia.

Its economic interests connect it simultaneously to China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, India and the Gulf states.

Malaysia’s Asean chairmanship in 2025 demonstrated the extent to which Kuala Lumpur can contribute to regional diplomacy when domestic political leadership and foreign-policy objectives are aligned.

Under the theme of “Inclusivity and Sustainability”, Malaysia sought to strengthen Asean cooperation while navigating an increasingly difficult geopolitical environment.

The danger emerges when Malaysian politics becomes permanently liquid: coalitions change partners, electoral arrangements become increasingly tactical, state elections become tests of federal legitimacy, and political parties devote disproportionate amounts of energy to immediate political survival.

Foreign policy requires precisely the opposite temperament.

It demands continuity.

Asean centrality depends upon member states being able to think beyond their next election.

Negotiations involving the South China Sea, Myanmar, artificial intelligence, energy transition, supply-chain resilience, climate change and Asean economic integration cannot be managed according to domestic electoral cycles.

If Malaysian governments become preoccupied with maintaining parliamentary numbers or responding continuously to state electoral setbacks, foreign policy inevitably competes with domestic political survival for attention.

There is a second danger. Political fluidity can weaken strategic predictability.

Asean succeeds partly because its member states understand one another’s broad strategic positions even when they disagree.

Malaysia has traditionally defended Asean autonomy while maintaining productive relationships with competing major powers.

If domestic political competition begins pulling Malaysian foreign policy between ideological poles, external powers may increasingly question the durability of Malaysian commitments.

That uncertainty matters.

China, the United States, Japan, India, the European Union and the Gulf states need to know whether Malaysia’s commitments possess institutional continuity.

Asean centrality itself becomes less convincing if its influential members appear incapable of maintaining consistent strategic direction.

Third, excessive political fluidity could reduce Malaysia’s capacity to act as a diplomatic bridge.

Malaysia has historically been capable of speaking comfortably with the West, China, the Islamic world and its immediate Southeast Asian neighbours.

This versatility constitutes an important form of diplomatic capital.

But diplomatic capital accumulates slowly and can dissipate quickly.

Fourth, Malaysia’s political stability affects Asean’s collective credibility.

Asean already confronts serious questions concerning Myanmar, major-power rivalry, the South China Sea, protectionism, technological competition and the effectiveness of consensus-based diplomacy.

Asean therefore cannot afford prolonged political uncertainty among its pivotal members.

Indonesia provides demographic and strategic weight.

Singapore provides enormous financial and institutional capacity. Malaysia contributes diplomatic versatility and connectivity across maritime Southeast Asia, the Muslim world and the wider Indo-Pacific.

If any one of these pillars becomes excessively inward-looking, Asean’s collective centre of gravity becomes weaker.

Finally, Asean centrality begins with national resilience. A country cannot consistently advocate strategic autonomy abroad while experiencing chronic political uncertainty at home.

Governments consumed by coalition management eventually risk becoming reactive rather than strategic.

This does not mean democratic competition should be suppressed in the name of Asean. Quite the contrary. Strong democracies can strengthen Asean.

The danger arises when democratic competition degenerates into permanent political manoeuvring where every state election, defection, coalition negotiation or ideological disagreement threatens another rearrangement of political power.

Malaysia must therefore recognise that political stability is no longer exclusively a domestic concern.

It has regional consequences.

Asean centrality will survive Malaysian political competition.

But if Malaysia enters an extended period of unstable coalitions, ideological polarisation and perpetual electoral manoeuvring, Asean will lose some of the diplomatic ballast Malaysia has historically provided.

Asean centrality cannot be defended through summit communiqués alone.

It must ultimately be supported by strong institutions and politically resilient member states capable of thinking in decades rather than electoral cycles.

Malaysia’s domestic stability, therefore, has become an increasingly important component of Asean’s strategic stability. - FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.