JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH INDONESIA MEMBUBARKAN DIRI - HOW MANY OF YOU WILL BELIEVE THIS?

 

• Our IGP said before there was 'rumah putih'. 
• Then it morphed and became Al Arqam. 
• Al Arqam then morphed and became Rufaqa. 
• Then Rufaqa morphed and became the present outfit.
  

Here is news (it is long but it should  be read - this time I am not editing it) that Indonesian, terrorist jihadi outfit Jemaah Islamiyah is "morphing".  

• Do note the highlighted passages.
  
• I have highlighted some passages in read. These are scary.
• I have highlighted some passages in black. These are really sh-t scary.
  

This is an analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah by Julie Chernov Hwang who is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Goucher College. My comments at the very end.

 

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH DISBANDS ITSELF: HOW, WHY, AND WHAT COMES NEXT?

Bottom Line Up Front:
* Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamist extremist group based in Indonesia, declared it would disband itself in late June.
* Jemaah Islamiyah leaders chose to eliminate the organizational JI so that the underlying community could survive.
* Jemaah Islamiyah will retain its network of 60 Islamic boarding schools but must revise the curriculum to eliminate extremist content.
* A team headed by Bambang Sukirno, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader, in conjunction with representatives from the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs and counter-terrorism unit, is socializing the decision to rank and file members in JI strongholds and at JI schools to increase the likelihood of in-group acceptance and to prevent splinters.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia’s most significant and influential Salafi-jihadist organization, declared it was disbanding earlier this summer on June 30. Surrounded by 15 senior leaders, spiritual leader Thoriqudin (alias Abu Rusydan) declared on video that he and the other leaders were dissolving the current structure and “returning to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia.” As part of that effort, they would work with the Indonesian Ministry of Religion to revise the curriculum at their 60 schools to eliminate extremism and conform to the national curricular standards (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-july-18/) . To demonstrate its commitment, JI surrendered its caches of weapons and provided the authorities with a list of members of the militant wing as well as the names of members who had trained in Syria.

Jemaah Islamiyah chose to sacrifice the organization to ensure the survival of their community. This was a multi-generational jihadi community bound by familial ties, marriages, friendship, shared experiences, mentor-protégé ties, and business relationships. By prioritizing the community over the organization, its members could be free to form new dakwah (Islamic propagation) organizations, open new schools, to join various above ground organizations and in so doing, work toward an Islamic society and state through political, economic, and societal mechanisms.

This decision to disband was the culmination of a 16-year process of reconsidering tactics and strategies that began with a revision of perspective on the use of violence. In 2008, when Para Wijayanto took over as JI’s amir, Jemaah Islamiyah had already begun shifting to a dakwah first strategy, eschewing the use of violence or participation in jihad within Indonesia proper. According to the Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), a non-profit organization based in Jakarta, “Abu Rusydan had argued in 2009 that JI could not hope to survive without the support of the [Indonesian Muslim] community and there was clearly no support for violence.”

Evidence of this strategic shift can be seen through changes in JI’s decision-making calculus and in its discourse. For example, JI forswore retaliation against Densus 88 (the Indonesian counterterrorism unit) for the 2007 raids on the Tanah Runtuh compound in Poso that had resulted in the deaths of 14 of its members. In 2010, Para Wijayanto forbade JI members from participating in a training camp in Aceh, the westernmost province in Indonesia, even though all other major violent extremist organizations had sent members.

Writing together, Sidney Jones, executive director of the Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict and Solahudin, author of The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, note that between 2009 and 2019, no Jemaah Islamiyah member carried out any terrorist attacks or participated in jihad in Indonesia proper. During the same period, Para Wijayanto was socializing a broader and more inclusive perspective on jihad. In 2016, after a lengthy debate on this issue, Para Wijayanto permitted JI members to join in the demonstrations against then governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). According to Alif Satria, an associate research fellow with the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), JI issued a fatwa supporting participating in peaceful demonstrations as “jihad through words.” This was new as the organization had typically associated jihad (struggle) with qital (battle). Moreover, JI permitted its members to vote in the 2019 presidential elections, confirming the political direction JI had already embarked upon.

However, it had not revised or abandoned its goal of an Islamic state or its view that I’dad (preparations) were necessary. To that end, it created a training program to improve its capacity to defend that future state. According to professors Julie Chernov Hwang and Kirsten Schulze, this included basic training run out of private homes — “the gym program” — and three to six months of paramilitary training in Syria for the top graduates of that program. Para Wijayanto shared that JI members were sent to train with the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat an-Nusra, Ahrar as-Sham, Suquour al Izz, and Hayat Tahrir al Shams. Eventually, JI set up its own training camp for its members near Salma, Syria.

The discovery of domestic and international training resulted in a massive crackdown by Indonesian police. Alif Satria states that by 2023, JI members accounted for 59 percent of all arrested terror suspects. It is during this period, with JI’s top leaders in prison, that dialogue between key JI leaders both in and out of prison and a select group of Densus 88 officers began about the future of JI. These discussions ultimately resulted in the decision this summer to dissolve the organization and its structure, with JI retaining control of its schools.

Interviews with two of the signatories of the June 30 statement explain the logic that underpinned JI’s decision to dissolve the organization. One senior Jemaah Islamiyah leader shared an ideological justification behind the decision to reconcile with the state and dissolve: “We came to the realization we cannot make war with the state and we’ve been coming to that realization for some time…. There was broad agreement between Para Wijayanto, the JI ulama and JI intellectuals that the government and the state were not kafir (infidel) or thoghut (unIslamic). Therefore, they cannot be the enemy.”

Another senior leader who had been intimately involved in the dialogues with Densus 88 offered a pragmatic assessment: “We cannot hold any activities, or we will go to jail. We cannot choose an amir because he would be sent to jail. If we don’t exist as an organization, all the wanted men can come out of hiding and come home. This is the key reason we dissolved. We looked at historical precedent. We assessed our experiences. We analyzed all of this, and we came to the conclusion that we are a community based on brotherhood. We do not need an organization.”

As IPAC notes, if JI continued its current path, its schools would eventually have been seized and more members would have been arrested. However, JI was a community first; even if they dissolved the organization, they would retain their core social ties. Disbanding would liberate them from the straitjacket in which they were operating and free them to continue their non-violent activities under other names. They could join other organizations already in existence that performed dakwah for a more Islamic society; they could establish new organizations to work for a more Islamic society and state; and they could continue to run their schools.

However, first it was necessary to explain the decision to the rank-and-file members, supporters, and the local leaders who may not have been a party to the dialogues. Therefore, JI set up a team under the leadership of Bambang Sukirno, a senior JI leader, to socialize the decision among the grassroots together with representatives from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Densus 88. At these meetings they explained the Islamic basis of their decisions and answered questions.

According to one senior leader who played a key role in the dialogues with Densus 88, these efforts have been met with acceptance. “[Our members] understand samino wa’atonah (To hear and to obey). That is part of our internal socialization that members and candidates for membership learn in the study sessions.” Another leader who played the role of facilitator between JI and the government concurred, asserting that the members who would have dissented had already departed JI to join Noordin M. Top’s al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago in 2004, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid in 2008, or the Aceh training camp in 2010. Those who remained were loyal, committed, and obedient.

To date, JI’s socialization efforts resulted in hundreds of ex-terrorist prisoners, rank and file members, and sympathizers declaring they would “return to the Republic of Indonesia.” According to local news reports, these include 177 members of the province of North Sumatra; 180 members from the city of Cirebon; 500 members from the city of Klaten, 124 sympathizers from the district of Poso and the towns of Morowali, North Morowali and Tojo Una; 54 members from the city of Palu; 56 members from the province of South Sumatra as well as members from the cities and towns of Indramayu, Kuningan, Subang, Majalengka, Bengkulu and Tasikmalaya.

The question remains: what will come next for the community formerly known as Jemaah Islamiyah? They still have members abroad, including 10-12 in Syria and 20 studying in Yemen. Whether they will accept the decision is an open question. However, JI’s former leaders appear committed to dakwah and education and if members of the community are disillusioned, they are keeping that quiet.

One of the key leaders involved in the dialogues spoke about his views on what the future held: “We will keep our schools strong. JI won’t stop struggling for an Islamic state because an Islamic state is not just for JI but for humanity. We will do dakwah and education through good works. Not through violence. Five to six years from now, I will be doing dakwah to bring people closer to JI’s perspective, without using JI’s name.”

Densus 88 and the Ministry of Religious Affairs should do their part to help JI members reintegrate back into society through destigmatization campaigns in villages, towns, and cities to ensure that former members and their children can be accepted by broader Indonesian Muslim society. Programs like Community-Based Correction, a mentoring program run by local governments in tandem with local civil society and businesses, can assist individuals in developing a post-group identity. Densus 88 would do well to allow JI some measure of privacy in this socialization effort rather than turning these meetings into a media spectacle, which could have the adverse effect of humiliating JI members and sympathizers in a tenuous period. JI members need to feel as though they belong, and that Indonesia is inclusive enough to also include them.

Julie Chernov Hwang is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Goucher College, a Senior Research Fellow at the Soufan Center, and a Harry Frank Guggenheim Distinguished Scholar.

My Comments : Nothing will really change. A leopard cannot change its spots. You cannot be 10% pregnant or 55% pregnant. Either you are pregnant or you are not.

The same applies for religion. You cannot believe only 10% of your religion or only 55% of your religion. Either you believe all of it or you do not.

Terrorism, in its broadest sense, is the use of violence against non-combatants to achieve political or ideological aims. The term is used in this regard primarily to refer to intentional violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants.

If your religion insists that apostates must be killed and you also believe the same you have a terrorist mind. Its as simple as that.

"If you do not believe as I believe then I will kill you".

If you believe that it is OK for the government or the religious authorities to use state sanctioned force or state sanctioned violence to enforce their version of religion it fits perfectly into the definition of terrorism.

"If you do not believe as I believe then I will arrest you, throw you in jail, whip you, fine you etc".

Because this is exactly what the Jemaah Islamiyah and ALL other jihadi terrorists see. They see that the State authority  have the right to legally use force and violence in the name of religion. As a clear cut example the Jemaah Islamiyah did join the "peaceful" protests against Jakarta mayor, Chinese-Christian Basuki Jahaja Purnama or Ahok which eventually saw Ahok jailed for two years for "insulting the Quran".

In their reckoning, the use of force and violence is ok in the name of religion.  

You cannot be 10% pregnant or 55% pregnant. 

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.