PAS at crossroads of power and decline

 PAS’s rise, built on tactical alliances and political opportunism, may now be reaching its structural limits as coalition tensions deepen.

From Shahrul Shahabudin

The Malaysian political landscape reveals a recurring trend: every major party eventually hits a ceiling.

Umno peaked in 2004, while PKR and DAP reached their heights in 2018. Today, PAS sits at its own apex with 43 parliamentary seats and had control of four states, at least until 2025, before a power tussle between the party and its then-partner Bersatu in Perlis over the menteri besar position.

History suggests that after such a peak, a period of stagnation or decline is inevitable. In Malaysia’s fragmented democracy, no party survives alone; they require strategic partnerships to rally voters from diverse backgrounds. PAS, however, has proven to be the undisputed master of this game.

While other parties struggle with the fallout of failed alliances, PAS has consistently reaped rewards from every partnership. In 1990, it teamed up with Umno splinter Semangat 46 to reclaim Kelantan. By 1999, it capitalised on the Reformasi wave to capture Terengganu.

The trend continued in 2008 under Pakatan Rakyat, where PAS expanded its footprint into Kedah and Perak. Most recently, through Perikatan Nasional, the Islamic party achieved its greatest electoral success in history, becoming the largest single party in the Dewan Rakyat.

These successes highlight a specific “business model.” Like a profit-driven conglomerate, PAS prioritises expansion and market share over brand loyalty. To call the party “disloyal” is not entirely correct; they simply follow a policy of institutional sustainability.

However, PAS is now at an unstable crossroads. The partnership with Bersatu, which propelled them to their current heights, is fraying. Despite remaining in the same coalition, recent friction suggests the alliance has reached its expiry date.

Even more confusing is the party’s apparent interest in Parti Wawasan Negara, a rebranded version of Parti Cinta Malaysia following a takeover by former Bersatu deputy president Hamzah Zainudin. This mirrors the 2015 episode when PAS split with DAP while trying to maintain ties with PKR, a strategy of “selective divorce.”

This “business-first” approach is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Backing a new, untested splinter party like Wawasan presents a major hurdle. Unlike Bersatu in 2020, a new movement lacks the grassroots mobilisation required to win general elections.

When PAS first officially became part of government after the Sheraton Move, it was within Muafakat Nasional while also aligning with Bersatu, which led the federal administration. Executive power and funding then became added advantages for PAS, alongside its strong grassroots mobilisation riding the so-called “green wave”.

Wawasan is not only a new movement but also lacks resources to provide the stability needed for PAS to live in a “risk-free” business environment.

The alternative, rekindling ties with Umno, is equally risky. As seen in the short-lived Muafakat Nasional, two parties competing for the same traditional voter base rarely achieve a stable balance of power.

PAS currently finds itself in uncharted waters. It is leading the pack rather than chasing from behind, and obviously, when you are at the top, you become the primary target for all others, and there is nowhere to go but down.

The ongoing internal opposition drama is also a distraction. Instead of acting as a credible “government-in-waiting”, PAS is weighed down by coalition infighting. Meanwhile, unity government partners Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional are also locked in their own battles ahead of the Johor and Negeri Sembilan state elections.

The party’s “lucky streak” has relied on finding the right partner at the right time, but as the political field narrows, the pool of viable partners is shrinking. Careless manoeuvring now could result in self-inflicted damage.

In essence, the very strategy that fuelled PAS’s rise, “short-term, high-gain alliances”, may now be its undoing. If they cannot find a stable anchor, the “business of politics” may finally produce a loss, a major deficit to be exact.

PAS rose by riding on the coattails of others, but that parasitic strategy has reached its limit. Now the dominant force, it can no longer hide behind partners and must prove it can lead by becoming a stable coalition anchor.

Failure to adapt to the burden of leadership will result in a major deficit at the next election, and this shift may ultimately signal the beginning of the end of their era of dominance. - FMT

Shahrul Shahabudin is an FMT reader and a political scientist by training.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.