In Part I, I characterised the Harapan Wave as having three features: “righteous” mobilisation, majority-building and majoritarian statecraft. I further point out that Pakatan Harapan is basically an imitation of the BN model, and Perikatan Nasional is effectively a Muslim-nationalist splinter of Harapan.
So, why can PN hold its ground and BN make a comeback, but not Harapan, I ask.
Because that model fits well for the Malay-Muslim nationalist blocs, because they command a majority, at least in the peninsula, and the liberal-minority bloc simply never commands a majority and never will.
This poses internal contradictions for Harapan. Majority-building is rational under First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) and good for democracy, but it will contradict “righteous” mobilisation.
Why a big tent won’t work
The proposed “big tent” of Harapan and Bersatu is another attempt at majority-building. With the BN-PN pact, a Harapan-Bersatu realignment would look naturally the former’s liberal/progressive/pluralist alternative.
For Harapan-Bersatu to be able to hold on to their Malay base or even win more Malay votes in this mode, it would need to move significantly to the right, basically imitating BN-PN.
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However, this would only dampen the liberal-minority voters’ turnout, while the Malay-Muslim nationalists/conservatives would still consider Harapan-Bersatu a counterfeit of BN-PN.
This is exactly what the Malay proverb describes: “yang dikejar tak dapat, yang dikendong keciciran” (Chasing the elusive while losing what you hold). Anwar Ibrahim has attempted to co-opt Umno but failed to win the Umno base. If this approach fails with Umno, how can it work with the much smaller remnant of Bersatu?
The point I take the pain to make is that imitation would not work for the liberal-minority bloc now, even though they had good luck twice in 2018 and 2020 because of Umno's choices.
Mobilisation - righteous to pragmatic?
Righteous mobilisation hurts Harapan and its aspirant successors like Bersama in two ways.
First, while righteous mobilisation delivers the most enthusiastic activists to fuel its initial expansion, for example, the DAP’s pre-2008 base, these enthusiasts would likely become the purist guardians that obstruct the party’s alliance and compromise with other parties.
Second, once righteous mobilisation becomes the modus operandi, messaging tends to go overboard and evoke anger from voters on the other side.
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The most recent example is DAP’s Kota Malacca MP Khoo Poay Tiong’s comment on the Friday prayer break regulation in Kuala Terengganu, which invited serious backlash from even Malay leaders in DAP and forced him to apologise immediately.
Two other examples are found in Bersama’s key opinion leader (KOL) lawyer Faizal Rahman. He first called Harapan’s women campaigners in tight T-shirts “jual bodi” (selling bodies) during the Malacca state election. A few days later, he attacked the nominal land premium of RM1,000 for the Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (KLSCAH), as announced by DAP’s Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Federal Territories), Hannah Yeoh.
While Faizal’s attacks may have earned applause from anti-Harapan/DAP and conservative/ethno-nationalist voters, this also hurts Bersama’s appeal to many women and the Chinese community whose support the party badly needs. In the latter, Bersama had to do damage control with an official statement.
Is it possible to mobilise voters by appealing to pragmatism – “the other party’s position does not suit our best interest, we must not vote for it” – without overboard fear-mongering or ridiculing the opponent? Yes, the party must first be able to treat its opponents and their supporters with some basic respect: “They are different. We disagree with their ways. But they are just as Malaysian as we are.”
Majority-building – from electoral to legislative?
Generally speaking, the incentive to build an electoral majority is a virtue of FPTP. It checks fragmentation in the party system, but not necessarily polarisation.
A two-party system can be polarised and uncompromising, as in the early decades of Trinidad and Tobago, divided between ethnic Indians and ethnic Africans, in Prof Donald Horowitz’s seminal book Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
However, it would be irrational for a party/coalition to alienate its base by chasing after an elusive majority. In a way, that is the Bersama’s strategy of non-alignment: to offer disgruntled Harapan voters a distinctive alternative, which may be imitated by DAP after GE16.
But that strategy poses a big challenge. Why should voters vote for a permanent opposition? Before the 1990s, many voters did so in protest. They needed PAS and DAP parliamentarians to provide checks and balances - never mind that these parties could not form government, influence lawmaking or policy formulation or deliver constituency service.
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The number of hardcore opposition voters has reduced over the years, at least on the Harapan’s side. If Harapan was condemned to be in opposition, as in Malacca, some might not see the reason to vote.
By ditching the elusive chase of an electoral majority, parties like Harapan and Bersama have only two ways to remain attractive.
The first way is to aim for forming or becoming part of the legislative majority, which may take the form of a coalition government or a confidence and supply agreement (CSA).
For the electoral dynamics explained earlier, Madani’s CSA with Bersatu is the right choice over a hasty co-optation of Bersatu into Harapan.
While Bersama wants to exploit the public distrust of the recent coalition governments, it may also want to ensure clarity in its messaging – collaboration with other parties (especially through CSA) is fine; the problem is secrecy and unaccountability.
The second way is to give the opposition meaningful roles. For Harapan, this is basically buying insurance for its post-GE16 time as the opposition. Continue to marginalise the opposition, and soon you would be hit by karma.
Separation of the attorney-general-public prosecutor role, equitable constituency allocation, empowerment of parliamentary committees, and even recognition of the shadow cabinet should be accomplished before GE16.
Governance – from majoritarian to consensus?
If Harapan and Bersama can ditch righteous mobilisation and the majority-building illusion, then the third characteristic of the Harapan Wave would change.
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Instead of aiming for dominance to implement its inclusive and reformist agenda (which has long been compromised, alienating its liberal-minority base), Harapan should aim to deconcentrate power for inclusion and reforms to be attained through inter-party negotiation and deals. This would shift Malaysia’s political system from majoritarianism to consensus.
While BN-PN, especially PAS, may oppose inclusive policies due to their positioning in identity politics, they are unlikely to oppose reforms that would better treat the opposition and level the playing field.
Ironically, this would allow the prime minister to fulfil more reform promises, raise the voting intention of Harapan voters and increase his chance of staying longer.
Anwar should seriously emulate his predecessor, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, in offering a memorandum of understanding for political transformation and stability in exchange for ethno-religious de-escalation. PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang would object to such a deal, but Anwar can nevertheless appeal to the PN base.
Regardless of the outcome, de-escalation of ethno-religious tension would improve Anwar’s approval in both Harapan's and BN-PN’s bases.
Alternative model possible but difficult
It is definitely possible for the liberal-minority bloc to again helm a coalition government after GE17, if it pursues a different wave that is based on pragmatic mobilisation, majority-building in only the legislative arena and consensus governance.
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We won’t know when the new wave would start, but it is definitely possible. But it would not be easy. Old habits and old learnings die hard. The liberal-minority bloc – both its political elites and its grassroots – would have a lot to learn, or unlearn, in strategies and behaviour.
They must first recognise that demographically they do not command a majority in the peninsula, and therefore they cannot count on being third time lucky to triumph in the majoritarian game. And even if they are lucky, they cannot become dominant like the old BN without losing their soul and becoming whom they once fought against.
Change is ultimately about changing the rules of the game, not just the winner. - Mkini
WONG CHIN HUAT is a political scientist at Sunway University and a member of Project Stability and Accountability for Malaysia (Projek Sama).
The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT




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