There’s a lesson in EU clash with Trump for Asean

Rather than retaliation, the Southeast Asian bloc should choose engagement, diversification, and strategic patience in dealings with the US.

The European Union’s (EU) increasingly confrontational stance toward the US over tariffs and Greenland reflects a deeper unease in transatlantic relations.

Faced with renewed pressure tactics from Washington, Europe appears determined to show resolve. Yet a head-to-head clash with Donald Trump is not necessarily wise.

For Asean, the unfolding crisis offers a cautionary tale rather than a model to follow.

At the heart of the dispute is not merely trade, but power.

Tariffs have become a political weapon, deployed to extract concessions far beyond economics. Greenland, with its strategic Arctic location and resources, has become a symbol of this new era of coercive bargaining.

Europe’s instinctive response has been to threaten counter-tariffs and to invoke its collective economic weight.

This may satisfy domestic audiences in Europe, but it risks escalation.

Trade wars rarely remain confined to balance sheets. They spill into markets, alliances, and political trust.

For Europe — whose economies are deeply intertwined with the US and whose security architecture still rests, directly or indirectly, on American power — confrontation carries real costs.

The EU prides itself on rules, norms, and multilateralism. Yet it now faces a partner that openly goes for leverage over legality and pressure over persuasion.

Responding in kind may appear logical, but it also locks Europe into a transactional logic where strength is measured by the ability to inflict pain rather than to sustain cooperation.

Asean must watch this carefully. Southeast Asia does not enjoy Europe’s level of economic resilience, institutional cohesion, or strategic insulation.

To emulate Europe’s confrontational posture would be to invite disproportionate retaliation.

Asean economies are export-oriented, trade-dependent, and tightly woven into global supply chains that still pass through the US.

Crucially, Asean is not a monolith.

It now comprises 11 members, with Timor-Leste’s accession widening the organisation’s diversity in development levels, political systems, and external alignments.

A unified retaliatory trade stance — of the kind the EU can at least attempt — is far harder for Asean to sustain.

Any escalation would almost certainly produce uneven winners and losers, straining Asean unity from within.

There is also a strategic dimension that Europe cannot escape but Asean can still manage. Europe is locked into a dense web of alliance expectations with Washington.

Asean, by contrast, has long practised hedging rather than binding. Its diplomacy has focused on keeping all major powers engaged without becoming captive to any single one.

This is where Asean’s much-criticised habits — consensus, informality, and quiet diplomacy — become assets rather than liabilities. These approaches are often dismissed as slow or indecisive.

Yet they have allowed Asean to survive repeated waves of great-power rivalry without becoming a battleground or a proxy arena.

A frontal clash with Washington would undermine Asean’s central role as a convenor and honest broker.

Asean’s value to the US, China, Europe, and others lies precisely in its refusal to turn disputes into zero-sum showdowns.

Once Asean adopts a confrontational posture, it risks losing that relevance — and with it, its strategic autonomy.

Europe’s dilemma also highlights a broader transformation in the global order.

The age of comfortable multilateralism is giving way to a harsher landscape where power, pressure, and personality matter more than procedures.

In such a world, institutional size alone does not guarantee protection.

Asean understands this reality intuitively. Its leaders know that survival depends less on winning arguments in public and more on managing risks quietly.

The objective is not to defeat a great power rhetorically, but to avoid becoming its preferred target.

This does not mean Asean should be submissive or silent.

Asean must defend its interests firmly, especially when trade measures threaten development, jobs, and social stability. But firmness does not require spectacle. Nor does resistance require retaliation.

Instead, Asean should double down on engagement, diversification, and strategic patience.

Broadening trade partners, strengthening intra-Asean economic ties, and quietly negotiating exemptions or adjustments are far more effective than public brinkmanship.

These tools preserve room for manoeuvre while reducing exposure to sudden shocks.

Europe may feel compelled to draw a line in the sand. Its political culture, legal identity, and domestic pressures push it toward visible defiance.

Asean faces a different calculus. Its legitimacy comes from stability, growth, and peace — not from symbolic victories.

Greenland may be geographically distant from Southeast Asia, but the lesson is immediate.

When trade becomes a tool of geopolitical coercion, smaller and middle powers must be selective in their responses. Mimicry can be dangerous.

In the end, Asean’s strength has never been about confronting great powers head-on. It has been about remaining indispensable, adaptable, and strategically ambiguous.

In an era of transactional politics, that may be the wisest form of power Asean possesses.

Europe’s clash with Washington may be unavoidable. Asean’s need not be. - FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.