COMMENT Various explanations have been advanced as to why P Waythamoorthy resigned as deputy minister and why the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the BN and Persatuan Hindraf Malaysia never got off the ground.
Predictably the two parties to the agreement have sought to blame the other side for this debacle.
Waythamoorthy has pointed the finger squarely at Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak and his lack of leadership qualities and insincerity in implementing the MOU.
From the other side, statements from the PM’s Umno cabinet colleagues, Khairy Jamaluddin and Hishammuddin Hussein, have depicted Waythamoorthy as being selfish, ineffective in representing Indian issues and “not a team player”.
Comments from both aligned and unaligned commentators have been more circumspect in assigning blame for the failure of what can be regarded as a landmark MOU between the ruling coalition and a dissident political force.
While some have lauded Waythamoorthy for quitting his position in government when he realised that the PM was not going to honour the pre-election commitments made to Indian Malaysians through the MOU, others have questioned his impatience in giving up so quickly and easily.
Raja Petra Kamarudin’s latestblog-post summarises the concern of more than a few observers that “eight months is too early to bail out”.
According to Raja Petra (right), who has a consistent, if sometimes controversial record of raising the bar on political standards himself, Waythamoorthy should “publicise his MOU with Najib and list out which of the promises were supposed to have been delivered in six months, which he says were not delivered. Surely not everything had a six-month timeframe.”
Raja Petra has a point. But it should not only be Waythamoorthy and the Hindraf central committee that are answerable.
The government needs to table its own version of which parts of the MOU have been implemented during the period of Waythamoorthy’s tenure in the cabinet; which are being planned for implementation in the next few months; and the schedule for implementation of the full programme of Indian Malaysian advancement leading up to the next general election.
After all, the PM in his delayed and rather mild response to Waythamoorthy’s resignation had noted: “I would like to stress that, in line with my dream to form a more approachable government that always gives help to those who need it, we will implement socio-economic development programmes for the Indian community, as well as the other races.”
So the details of which parts of the MOU have been implemented and which have not should not be difficult to share with the public, even with Waythamoorthy’s departure.
The full text of the MOU is available on Hindraf’s website, but not on anygovernment website, including the Prime Minister’s Department to which Waythamoorthy was attached.
Real reasons for failure
In retrospect, it is clear that the MOU never stood a chance of succeeding even if Waythamoorthy had decided to stay the course and not bail out prematurely as some have described it. There were three strikes against Waythamoorthy and the MOU.
The first was that he was fighting for an Indian cause against a bureaucracy that has been dominated by the Malay agenda, and is run by a predominantly Malay civil service.
The second is that the implementation unit and the independent budget that he was counting on to tackle the problems of Indian marginalisation would have cut into the turf of existing power groups and alignments, including those associated with the MIC and other Indian interest groups aligned to the BN.
But perhaps the most potent strike was that of a PM who vacillated between his 1Malaysia vision and the ketuanan Melayu culture and ethos of his own party, and who eventually decided that his own vision had to give way. Whether this was because of political expediency or political dishonesty will have to be left to the public to decide.
The fact that Najb met with Waythamoorthy in 16 separate meetings is not indicative of a leader who had no time for the Indian cause or that he saw it as unimportant.
It may have been due to sheer political expediency but I personally think Najib was initially sincere and confident that he could push through at least some parts of the MOU which would have kept Waythamoorthy in his cabinet and swayed Indian support back to the BN.
But the combined resistance - mostly from within the civil service but also from Umno and some MIC politicians - was too great.
Some 800,000 displaced estate workers and the estimated 350,000 stateless persons of Indian origin tell a story, not simply of neglect but of deep-seated political negligence.
It also tells of the way in which institutionalised racism has blighted the civil service. This is the most damaging legacy of BN rule. It is now so embedded in the civil service that it can hold politicians - even the PM - to ransom.
Raja Petra is right when he warns that “(t)here is no quick or fast track to social re-engineering”.
But how can any social re-engineering come about when the civil service and implementation machinery is not responsive and accountable; is opposed to change; and sees any reform as undermining national (read Malay) interests?
A stronger, more forceful and principled leader in the PM’s seat may be able to trigger the social re-engineering that the country badly needs. But such a leader does not appear visible at all on our horizon.
LIM TECK GHEE is director of the Centre for Policy Initiatives.
Predictably the two parties to the agreement have sought to blame the other side for this debacle.
Waythamoorthy has pointed the finger squarely at Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak and his lack of leadership qualities and insincerity in implementing the MOU.
From the other side, statements from the PM’s Umno cabinet colleagues, Khairy Jamaluddin and Hishammuddin Hussein, have depicted Waythamoorthy as being selfish, ineffective in representing Indian issues and “not a team player”.
Comments from both aligned and unaligned commentators have been more circumspect in assigning blame for the failure of what can be regarded as a landmark MOU between the ruling coalition and a dissident political force.
While some have lauded Waythamoorthy for quitting his position in government when he realised that the PM was not going to honour the pre-election commitments made to Indian Malaysians through the MOU, others have questioned his impatience in giving up so quickly and easily.
Raja Petra Kamarudin’s latestblog-post summarises the concern of more than a few observers that “eight months is too early to bail out”.According to Raja Petra (right), who has a consistent, if sometimes controversial record of raising the bar on political standards himself, Waythamoorthy should “publicise his MOU with Najib and list out which of the promises were supposed to have been delivered in six months, which he says were not delivered. Surely not everything had a six-month timeframe.”
Raja Petra has a point. But it should not only be Waythamoorthy and the Hindraf central committee that are answerable.
The government needs to table its own version of which parts of the MOU have been implemented during the period of Waythamoorthy’s tenure in the cabinet; which are being planned for implementation in the next few months; and the schedule for implementation of the full programme of Indian Malaysian advancement leading up to the next general election.
After all, the PM in his delayed and rather mild response to Waythamoorthy’s resignation had noted: “I would like to stress that, in line with my dream to form a more approachable government that always gives help to those who need it, we will implement socio-economic development programmes for the Indian community, as well as the other races.”
So the details of which parts of the MOU have been implemented and which have not should not be difficult to share with the public, even with Waythamoorthy’s departure.
The full text of the MOU is available on Hindraf’s website, but not on anygovernment website, including the Prime Minister’s Department to which Waythamoorthy was attached.
Real reasons for failure
In retrospect, it is clear that the MOU never stood a chance of succeeding even if Waythamoorthy had decided to stay the course and not bail out prematurely as some have described it. There were three strikes against Waythamoorthy and the MOU.
The first was that he was fighting for an Indian cause against a bureaucracy that has been dominated by the Malay agenda, and is run by a predominantly Malay civil service.
The second is that the implementation unit and the independent budget that he was counting on to tackle the problems of Indian marginalisation would have cut into the turf of existing power groups and alignments, including those associated with the MIC and other Indian interest groups aligned to the BN.
But perhaps the most potent strike was that of a PM who vacillated between his 1Malaysia vision and the ketuanan Melayu culture and ethos of his own party, and who eventually decided that his own vision had to give way. Whether this was because of political expediency or political dishonesty will have to be left to the public to decide.The fact that Najb met with Waythamoorthy in 16 separate meetings is not indicative of a leader who had no time for the Indian cause or that he saw it as unimportant.
It may have been due to sheer political expediency but I personally think Najib was initially sincere and confident that he could push through at least some parts of the MOU which would have kept Waythamoorthy in his cabinet and swayed Indian support back to the BN.
But the combined resistance - mostly from within the civil service but also from Umno and some MIC politicians - was too great.
Some 800,000 displaced estate workers and the estimated 350,000 stateless persons of Indian origin tell a story, not simply of neglect but of deep-seated political negligence.It also tells of the way in which institutionalised racism has blighted the civil service. This is the most damaging legacy of BN rule. It is now so embedded in the civil service that it can hold politicians - even the PM - to ransom.
Raja Petra is right when he warns that “(t)here is no quick or fast track to social re-engineering”.
But how can any social re-engineering come about when the civil service and implementation machinery is not responsive and accountable; is opposed to change; and sees any reform as undermining national (read Malay) interests?
A stronger, more forceful and principled leader in the PM’s seat may be able to trigger the social re-engineering that the country badly needs. But such a leader does not appear visible at all on our horizon.
LIM TECK GHEE is director of the Centre for Policy Initiatives.
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