WIKILEAKS: UMNO AND ITS COALITION IN DISARRAY AHEAD OF ANWAR'S SEPTEMBER 16 DEADLINE

On September 7, word leaked out that BN suddenly had organized a "compulsory" overseas study tour for all 81 parliamentary backbenchers (those who do not serve as ministers or deputy ministers) that would corral the MPs overseas from September 8 until September 17, a day after Anwar's deadline. (As of September 9, 41 MPs had departed; some MPs have refused to go citing fasting month activities with constituents.) UMNO leaders' explanations that the trip was essential for the MPs to learn about the latest agricultural techniques in Taiwan failed to convince; instead, this has appeared to most observers as a measure of desperation by a government unsure of its support.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d)

Summary

1. (C) Prime Minister Abdullah and top leaders of his United Malays National Organization (UMNO) appear unnerved as they approach the September 16 deadline set by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for toppling Abdullah's National Front (BN) government. UMNO's disarray and the weakness of the BN coalition have been exposed in the run-up to the 16th. The strongest indications that Anwar could make good on his promise emanate from UMNO itself, including the party's public preoccupation with the question of crossovers and the seemingly desperate decision to corral BN MP's abroad so that they would be out of the country for Anwar's deadline.

UMNO's lack of self-confidence reflects the party's ongoing leadership crisis and lack of faith in Abdullah, absence of a viable new vision for the party, and the further erosion of support, particularly among non-Malays, for the ruling coalition since the March election set-back. BN has frayed further along racial lines following caustic remarks about Malaysian Chinese by an UMNO division leader, who has refused Abdullah's instructions to apologize, a situation prompting an unusual warning from the Armed Force chief. The government has not stopped Anwar with charges of sodomy, while Anwar received a strong boost through his successful election to parliament last month, bringing him one step closer to his goal of becoming the next Prime Minister.

2. (C) UMNO's disarray and the exposed weakness of the BN multi-racial coalition, rather than the unlikely prospect of 30-plus crossovers by September 16, appear to be the most important story at this juncture. Along with this come renewed doubts about Prime Minister Abdullah's longevity in office and his ability to see himself through December and the UMNO elections. End Summary.

Uncertain Prospects for September 16 Crossovers

3. (C) Prime Minister Abdullah and top leaders of his ruling UMNO party appear unnerved as they approach the September 16 deadline set by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for toppling Abdullah's National Front (BN) government. With only one week to go before the 16th (which marks the formation of modern Malaysia through the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak, appealing to would-be defectors in those states), no MPs have confirmed publicly their intentions to switch sides, nor do we or our close partner embassies have private confirmation of defections. Anwar, who also leads the People's Justice Party (PKR), continues to intimate that crossovers will happen by September 16, or thereabouts, but his lieutenants and the leaders of his coalition parties, PAS and DAP, have hedged their comments to us and to the media.

UMNO Jittery, Corrals MPs Abroad

4. (C) In the absence of concrete evidence of imminent crossovers, the strongest indications that Anwar could make good on his promise emanate from UMNO itself which seems gripped by doubt bordering on panic. PM Abdullah, Deputy PM Najib, and other top UMNO leaders have issued repeated public denials that the government would lose its parliamentary majority, or that Anwar was a verge of presenting the King (who plays a crucial constitutional role in change-of-government scenarios) with a list of cross-over supporters.

On September 7, word leaked out that BN suddenly had organized a "compulsory" overseas study tour for all 81 parliamentary backbenchers (those who do not serve as ministers or deputy ministers) that would corral the MPs overseas from September 8 until September 17, a day after Anwar's deadline. (As of September 9, 41 MPs had departed; some MPs have refused to go citing fasting month activities with constituents.) UMNO leaders' explanations that the trip was essential for the MPs to learn about the latest agricultural techniques in Taiwan failed to convince; instead, this has appeared to most observers as a measure of desperation by a government unsure of its support.

5. (C) We have had private indications as well of UMNO's lack of self confidence. The British High Commissioner (protect) informed the Ambassador that he recently received a telephone call from a cabinet minister. The minister asked the British envoy whether Anwar really had sufficient numbers of MPs prepared to cross-over and bring down the government.

A senior leader within the UMNO Youth division contacted us to ask what the U.S. position would be when Anwar takes over the government through "undemocratic" means. UMNO Youth subsequently called on the Bar Council and NGOs, organizations UMNO has derided in the past, to speak out against Anwar's plans.

Lack of Confidence; UMNO Leadership Unresolved

6. (C) UMNO's lack of self-confidence in the face of Anwar's threats reflects the party's lack of consolidation since the March election debacle and unresolved, fundamental challenges to the party's future. First, UMNO had not yet emerged from its leadership crisis. Abdullah Badawi has remained Prime Minister and party president, not because he has rallied the confidence of UMNO leaders and the public -- he has not.

By and large, UMNO members continue to view Abdullah as inadequate and weak-willed, and have provided only tepid support for Abdullah's plan to hand over power to DPM Najib in mid-2010. Abdullah essentially has remained in place because Najib, his main potential challenger, has so far been too politically vulnerable to make a move. Top-down party control mechanisms allow Abdullah to smother or shut off other challengers, and circumstances have not yet forced UMNO elites to take drastic action to force Abdullah's resignation. UMNO anxiety over Abdullah's weak leadership remains, however, and is in a large part a function of the threat to UMNO posed by Anwar, as witnessed during the immediate aftershock of the March electoral setback.

The greater Anwar's threat, the more UMNO leaders are willing to consider replacing Abdullah with a stronger, more competent defender of the party. UMNO public rhetoric in early September, such as UMNO Selangor warlord Khir Toyo's public suggestion Abdullah could be eased out like Malaysia's first Prime Minister Abdul Rahman in the midst of race riots in 1969, has begun to take on the ominous tones we heard in the weeks following the March 8 election.

UMNO Yet to Find Viable Model for Renewal

7. (C) UMNO's lack of confidence also grows out of its failure to reform or arrive at a viable vision for its political future. Some UMNO leaders flirted with democratic reform and good governance concepts to revive the party's image and appeal to the public, skirting closer to the Opposition platform. Such internal party consideration died out by early May, as UMNO saw that it could operate the levers of power even with a robust number of opposition seats in Parliament.

PM Abdullah's announcement of a populist budget in late August also failed to give UMNO a boost or make up for politically unpopular fuel price hikes earlier in the year. To the extent that UMNO leaders have embraced a model for consolidating and energizing the party, they have fallen back on the old model of Malay chauvinism, utilizing the UMNO controlled Malay language media to warn of the Opposition's threats to the primacy of Islam and Malay privileges. Absent gross missteps by Anwar's non-Malay allies, such calls so far have had limited resonance among today's better-educated, less rural Malay population. Appeals for Malay Muslim solidarity to date also have failed to woo support from conservative PAS voters, who broadly rejected UMNO's behind the scenes overtures to select PAS leaders when these talks came to light.

Increased Stress on BN's Multi-Racial Coalition

8. (C) UMNO's unresolved leadership crisis, lack of reform and resort to Malay chauvinism have had a clear negative impact on UMNO's non-Malay partners in the National Front coalition, already weakened by the exodus of non-Malay voters in the March polls. Chinese and Indian support for BN has eroded further since March, as indicated by limited polling and escalating flare-ups between UMNO hardliners and Chinese leaders in the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Gerakan party. The recent remarks by Penang UMNO division leader Ahmad Ismail, referring to Chinese citizens as "squatters", has touched off the most serious inter-racial feuding within BN, with MCA and Gerakan raising questions about their future within UMNO.

Abdullah Struggles to Contain Inter-Racial Feud

9. (C) Abdullah thus far has not succeeded in controlling the Ahmad Ismail situation; Abdullah delegated an apology via DPM Najib, but Ahmad Ismail refused the party president's instructions to back down, providing a rebuke to Abdullah's leadership. MCA and Gerakan announced on September 8 they had broken relations with UMNO within Penang state. Abdullah reportedly will use the BN's September 9 leadership to try to end BN's current inter-racial feud and repair relations with MCA in particular.

Prior to the meeting, Armed Force Chief Abdul Aziz remarked to an UMNO gathering that the government must act sternly against those who could provoke racial conflict, an unusual statement from the military that normally refrains from such comments and which in the local context may be taken as a warning to non-Malays. While UMNO could succeed in patching up this immediate issue, UMNO's continued emphasis on ultra-Malay rhetoric guarantees growing strains with MCA and other BN partners, including those in East Malaysia.

Anwar Buoyed by Election

10. (C) While UMNO and BN struggle internally, Anwar Ibrahim received a major boost with his late August election to Parliament which made him Opposition leader in Parliament and brought him one necessary step closer to becoming the next Prime Minister (only MPs may become Prime Minister). Anwar's victory in the Penang by-election in his home district was never in serious doubt, but the huge margin of his victory, exceeding that of his wife in March, was grim news to

Abdullah and UMNO, setting off renewed calls within UMNO for Abdullah to step down quickly. Since then, Anwar and his PKR lieutenants have tried to press their advantage by reaffirming that they have over 30 MPs ready to cross over, even while some have downplayed the significance of the September 16 deadline. Anwar countered Abdullah's populist budget with his own economic vision. As BN's racial problems deepened, he Opposition alliance (Pakatan) on September 8 sought political advantage by issuing a statement condemning UMNO's Ahmad Ismail and other UMNO leaders for racially charged rhetoric while affirming Pakatan's adherence to the Constitution's provisions for Islam and Malay prerogatives.

Sodomy Trial Pending; the Temptation to Deny Bail

11. (C) The government's pursuit of sodomy charges against Anwar has not derailed the Opposition leader, but conversely has generated some sympathy for Anwar as a victim of persecution among the majority of the population who view the charges as politically motivated. Anwar's continued bail and freedom of movement, pending the outcome of the trial which may consume many months, is a critical matter for the Opposition; Anwar in jail could not hope to negotiate crossovers and the formation of a new government, a role that only he can play at this juncture.

Although the government so far has not pressed for Anwar's detention during the trial, and has made arguments for revocation of bail less credible by granting police bail in July and not challenging bail when Anwar was charged with the crime in August, UMNO leaders could be sorely tempted to revisit the question.

Detaining Anwar would be one way to try to put an end the cross-over threat, though such a move would entail costs including in the realm of public opinion. (Note: Anwar will appear in court tomorrow, September 10; PKR supporters currently are speaking about the possible denial of bail, while the authorities are warning against disruptions at the court venue. End Note.)

Comment

12. (C) We believe the odds are against Anwar getting the necessary 30 or more crossovers to bring down the government in one week's time, despite UMNO's evident insecurity. Many MPs will want to be assured they are joining the winning side and not exposing themselves to excessive risk; the crossing over of parties, rather than individuals, would provide more security in this regard. Parties also bring with them more bargaining power to a new coalition. Aside from a few micro-parties, like SAPP in Sabah, there is little indication Anwar has sealed such party deals. The Opposition also recognizes a risk if too many non-Malays join their ranks without a number of Malays in the mix, as this would feed immediately into UMNO's claims that the Opposition threatens Malay interests and Islam.

13. (C) It is plausible that Anwar arranges for some MPs to crossover on or by September 16, preserving the credibility of his threat and giving him a basis for arguing that it is only a matter of time. If no one jumps by September 16, Anwar's arguments will be harder to make, and he may lose the momentum he currently enjoys from his recent election to Parliament. Nevertheless, Anwar has committed himself to the project of bringing down the UMNO/BN government through crossovers, rather than waiting for another national election in three or four years time. September 16 will not be the end of Anwar's push.

14. (C) UMNO's disarray and the exposed weakness of the BN multi-racial coalition, rather than the prospect of September 16 crossovers, appears to be the most important story at this specific juncture. Crossover panic represents a symptom of UMNO's predicament more so than a reflection of Anwar's strength. Along with this come renewed doubts about Prime Minister Abdullah's longevity in office and his ability to see himself through December and the UMNO elections. As collateral damage from UMNO's leadership struggle and preoccupation with warding off Anwar, we can expect government policy-making to continue at best in an ad hoc fashion when it is not paralyzed altogether. Attention to foreign policy will take a distant back seat unless it is linked to political survival at home.

KEITH (September 2008)