MCA-Gerakan ties: Vintage soap opera

Our writer digs into the archives to trace the ups and downs – but mostly downs – in the relationship between the two parties.

COMMENT

“In essence, MCA and Gerakan are like two fat ladies trying to go through a small and narrow door together.” This statement comes from a document in the MCA archives of 1987 and records a remark made in a discussion among the party’s national leaders.

The speaker of those words, trying to explain what he called the “dichotomy” in MCA’s relationship with Gerakan, added: “On the one hand, the Chinese expect MCA and Gerakan to work closely together for the community. On the other hand, Gerakan’s very existence is a thorn in MCA’s flesh.”

The late journalist MGG Pillai, emphasising the ideological differences between the two warring parties, said one was chalk and the other cheese, and that each was constantly trying its best to “force the other off its political path”.

The origins of the animosity go back to the 1958 MCA elections, when Dr Lim Chong Eu challenged founding father Tan Cheng Lock for the presidency and won by 22 votes. During Lim’s short presidency, MCA suffered a severe internal split and a stormy relationship with its Alliance partner Umno, then headed by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Lim eventually left the party in December 1960, citing irreconcilable differences with the leadership of the Alliance on a number of issues, including the allocation of parliamentary seats.

He went on to form the United Democratic Party, which in 1969 merged with the Labour Party to form Gerakan, in time for the general election. The 1969 election resulted in Gerakan taking control of Penang. In 1973, it joined the Alliance, and the coalition changed its name to Barisan Nasional.

There is clear evidence from the MCA archives that the party attempted a coup in Penang after the 1969 election. It tried to entice two Gerakan state assemblymen to defect. The attempt failed chiefly because Umno was not in favour of it. It was probably then that the bad blood between Gerakan and MCA began to thicken into a malignant clot. Indeed, it was only recently – after more than 40 years – that the MCA headquarters finally listed Lim as a former party president.

In 1999, another crisis erupted when two Gerakan state assemblymen resigned from their party following the general election of that year.

“MCA went for the kill,” wrote Pillai. It claimed it had the right to the Penang Chief Minister’s seat now that it had more members in the legislature than did its rival.

Umno seemingly stayed out of the conflict, but suggested that the two parties take turns at the chief minister’s post. Eventually, however, even this musical-chair arrangement was abandoned and MCA never got into the chief minister’s office. The post went to Gerakan’s Koh Tsu Koon. Six of MCA’s nine assemblymen were absent from the swearing-in ceremony, but the party denied that it was a boycott, saying the six had other functions to attend.

Some use the Sanskrit word “sandiwara” to describe the turbulent relationship between the two parties. It is an appropriate word because the Malays traditionally use it to refer to soap operas. And this particular sandiwara has had a long run.

Proposed merger

On April 1, 1985, then Gerakan president Dr Lim Keng Yaik signed an agreement with MCA’s acting president, Neo Yee Pan, to set up a joint council to discuss a proposed merger.

During a break in the negotiations, Keng Yaik told reporters: “I told them I am ready to accept all MCA members. But how can they say they can only accept part of our membership by excluding the non-Chinese members? If Gerakan and MCA were to merge, both parties should open their doors (to all races).”

Although he was smiling, Keng Yaik was only half joking when he used an analogy that he attributed to his predecessor. “Chong Eu always said that we are a big hole while MCA is a small hole. A small hole would not admit big cats, but any cat can pass through our big hole.” It was his way of saying that for a merger to be possible, MCA must sacrifice some of the benefits of being communal and Gerakan must be the big brother.

The sub-plot revolving around a merger had been introduced in the sandiwara long before the April Fool’s Day agreement, but it had gathered enough momentum by early 1985 that even sceptics were turning into wishful thinkers.

However, just a month before the joint council was formed, MCA Youth secretary Chew Hock Thye dismissed speculation about the merger as a rumour, saying: “There is a stumbling block in the fundamentally different political stances of the parties as one represents the Chinese community and the other is a multi-racial one.”

Neo repeated the denial on March 15. While admitting that a joint council was in the offing, he said it had nothing to do with a merger. Instead, he explained, its aims, among other things, were to promote understanding and cooperation among members of the two parties; to undertake common projects in education, economics, culture and other fields; to adopt a common approach towards national issues; and to create a congenial atmosphere for racial harmony and national unity.

The council had five representatives from each party – the president, the deputy president, the secretary-general and two other appointees.

But hardly three months after the council was formed, Gerakan publicly accused MCA of trying to instigate its members to join the Chinese party. The bickering continued, even after Tan Koon Swan, who had taken over the MCA presidency in November 1985, announced: “The MCA has adopted a policy of maximum co-operation with the Gerakan and will direct its state and divisional leaders to stop squabbling with Gerakan members. We are even prepared to consider a possible merger with the Gerakan as a long-term plan.” Just weeks after that, however, he signalled that the proposal was heading towards troubled waters, saying only party members could decide on a merger.

Gerakan publicly complained that the joint council was going about its business too slowly. This agitated the MCA leadership, saying any dissatisfaction should be conveyed to the council itself, not the press.

By June 1986, it became quite clear to the sandiwara audience that the council was at least half dead. MCA secretary-general Lee Kim Sai said MCA did not “have the time” for merger talks.

Back to square one

Still, both sides kept insisting that the council was very much alive. It was only in 1988 that the Gerakan president admitted that the two parties had nothing in common to talk about. And MCA accused Gerakan of being “foxy” in its approach to politics and vowed not to have anything more to do with the council.

The minutes of a top-level MCA meeting in June 1988 recorded the following statement: “In response to Lim Keng Yaik’s statement that the joint council has died a natural death, the party confirms Lee Kim Sai’s response that Gerakan killed the joint council due to Gerakan’s constant sabotaging of MCA’s efforts in pursuing Chinese rights and interests.

“The party’s stand has all along been that MCA is a communal-based party committed to a multi-racial government. In line with this, the president reiterated that [MCA’s objectives are] more effectively pursued along racial lines in that it is easier to mobilise support.

“This is not the right time for multi-racial parties.”

So it was back to square one, and each party continued to do its best to undercut the other.

It was years later that Ong Ka Ting, who became MCA president in 2003, disclosed at a top-level meeting that Kheng Yaik wanted closer MCA-Gerakan cooperation. He said the Gerakan president, before stepping down in April 2007, had told Ong to work closely with his successor, Koh Tsu Koon.

But it was not to be. The 2008 general election nearly demolished both parties and Ong voluntarily stepped down as his party’s president.

Stanley Koh is a former head of MCA’s research unit. He is a FMT columnist.