Trump’s United States of the Americas

Donald Trump's national security strategy seems premised on getting the US inside the rest of the Americas economically and strategically as much as on keeping other countries out.

National security strategies, released from time to time by every US administration, often say little and are quickly forgotten. The latest one, however, issued by the Donald Trump administration late last week, is the exception. It is must reading, for it previews the biggest redirection of US foreign policy since the dawn of the Cold War 80 years ago.

What leaps out is the prioritisation of economic and commercial interests. The document speaks of reducing America’s trade imbalances, increasing commerce, securing supply chains, and reindustrialising the country.

Allies are considered allies only so long as they assume a much larger share of the defense burden. Geoeconomics has superseded geopolitics. Investment is in; assistance is out. Fossil fuels and nuclear power are in; wind, solar, and other renewables are out – along with climate change concerns.

The biggest change is that the Western Hemisphere, long largely ignored, is now at the centre of America’s national-security policy. It comes first in the list of what the US wants in and from the world; it is discussed at length before every other region.

The newfound priority can best be understood as stemming from heightened concern over homeland security, an extension of domestic efforts to thwart drug trafficking and stop illegal immigration.

America’s military presence will shift accordingly. In short, the “Trump Corollary” now takes its place alongside the Monroe Doctrine and the (Theodore) Roosevelt Corollary, although the policy seems premised on getting the US inside the rest of the Americas economically and strategically as much as on keeping others out.

The Indo-Pacific is the silver medalist in terms of attention. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of focus on economic dimensions of policy, on “rebalancing America’s economic relationship with China, prioritising reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence”. That said, the document does state that deterring a conflict over Taiwan is a priority.

North Korea, however, is not mentioned. How the administration plans to balance its economic and strategic goals in this part of the world is unknown, making Trump’s planned visit to China next spring critical.

By contrast, the administration wants to downsize America’s role in the Middle East, which has dominated US foreign policy for much of the past 35 years.

Whether this will prove possible remains to be seen: the strategy arguably exaggerates what has been accomplished in terms of promoting peace and weakening Iran. Africa, despite being the region set to experience the greatest population growth, is mostly an afterthought.

Europe comes in for the harshest treatment. After describing the continent’s all-too-evident economic troubles, the document asserts that: “This economic decline is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilisational erasure.”

The European Union is depicted as undermining liberty and sovereignty. The strategy goes on to say: “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognisable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.”

Curiously, the paper ends its discussion of Europe on a somewhat more positive note. “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” But the overall treatment of Europe is negative, patronising, and ominous.

Russia gets off easy. It is not treated as an adversary. The push for peace in Ukraine is unconditional. And Russian president Vladimir Putin will take comfort in the stated goal of reestablishing “strategic stability with Russia” and in what is said about Nato, namely, that the time has come to end “the perception, and prevent the reality, of Nato as a perpetually expanding alliance”.

One could be forgiven for reading the strategy document as an implicit embrace of spheres of influence. The US will have the lead in the Western Hemisphere, Russia and the EU will be left to sort it out in Europe, and China will have a large say in Asia’s future so long as it doesn’t go too far. The document doesn’t mince words here: “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.”

The strategy is not isolationist, but it does represent a more pinched, narrow view of US interests and involvement. “The days of the US propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”

Mixed in is a good deal of unilateralism and a strong bias against international institutions, which tend to be depicted as inherently anti-American and a threat to national sovereignty.

The new foreign policy is not so much immoral as it is amoral. Europe aside, there is a bias against interfering in others’ internal affairs. “We seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories.”

This hyper-realism is highlighted in the section advocating cooperation with Middle East governments. “Doing so will require dropping America’s misguided experiment with hectoring these nations – especially the Gulf monarchies – into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government.”

What does it all add up to? The era in which the US anchored alliances and international institutions, stood up for democracy and human rights, and was prepared to sacrifice for the rule of law and the balance of power around the world, has ended. In its place is a world in which US actions are determined more by what is of direct benefit to the US economy, individual US businesses, and the security of the homeland.

A future president may well alter elements of this approach to the world – above all, the focus on the Americas – but in the meantime, a messier, less free, and less prosperous world is the likely result, in no small part because this administration has more than three years left to run.

Russia and China will find opportunity here while traditional friends and allies in Europe and Asia will experience greater risk and face difficult choices. The only certainty is that a historical era is ending, and a new one is beginning. - FMT

Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a senior counselor at Centerview Partners, and distinguished university scholar at New York University.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.