The hollow Saudi-Iranian agreement

 

The recently announced Chinese-brokered agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations is the latest sign that China is muscling its way into international diplomacy.

Some see the deal as further evidence of the US’ eroding might and influence, and of its Middle East fatigue. In fact, the agreement is less a sign of American torpor than a reflection of unique regional circumstances.

More fundamentally, the agreement is not the breakthrough it has been made out to be. Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter adversaries with a century-long history of enmity and distrust. It is extremely unlikely that they will suddenly become friendly neighbours.

Some analysts see the deal as a testament to China’s policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, in line with China’s own framing of the news.

But while it is certainly true that the US never could have mediated between the Iranians and the Saudis, given that it has been isolating Iran with sanctions for many years, this reality also gives the Iranians a powerful incentive to take any opportunity to poke America in the eye. If they can accentuate China’s diplomatic credentials and give pundits fodder with which to disparage the US, they will.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, had been a pillar of America’s Middle East policy ever since the British announced their withdrawal of forces from the Persian Gulf in 1968.

But when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) took the reins of power in the Kingdom, the situation became more complicated. His approach to the US relationship has consisted of cozying up to Republicans like Donald Trump, while making life harder for Democrats like Joe Biden.

This wariness of Democrats dates back to 2015, when US president Barack Obama green-lit a nuclear agreement with Iran without consulting the Saudis. He then implied that Saudi Arabia is a “free rider,” and argued that the situation in the Persian Gulf “requires us to say to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective way to share the neighbourhood”.

These comments clearly irked the Saudis, prompting the former Saudi ambassador to the US to write a commentary listing all the contributions his country had made to America’s national security.

It is widely known that MBS disdains Biden (who previously confronted him about the murder of Saudi-born journalist Jamal Khashoggi), and maintains warm ties with those around Trump, not least his son-in-law, Jared Kushner. For both personal and political reasons, MBS, too, is motivated to humiliate and undercut the Biden administration at every turn.

But it is unclear how long MBS will be able to tout this victory. The new agreement is no Camp David Accord (which effectively ended war between Arab states and Israel); nor is it comparable even to the Abraham Accords (which established relations between Israel and Arab countries that had never joined a war against it).

Rather, the agreement’s text promises little more than a resumption of normal diplomatic ties. It is less gold than glitter. Without more concrete steps towards reconciliation, backed by external guarantees and supervision, the Chinese-brokered accord may simply represent an interregnum before the next phase of bilateral tensions.

After all, consider how abysmal the two countries’ post-independence relations have been. Iran severed ties with the Kingdom in 1944 after the Saudis executed an Iranian pilgrim who accidentally desecrated a rock in Islam’s holiest shrine.

They reconciled in 1966. But then, in 1988, the Saudis cut ties after Iranian political demonstrations during the haj pilgrimage the year before left at least 402 dead. Relations were then resumed in 1991, before being suspended again in 2016, when Saudi Arabia beheaded a Shia cleric, leading protesters to storm its embassy in Tehran.

Most of these earlier reconciliations were driven by larger regional and global forces. In 1966, for example, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab secular rhetoric pushed the Saudis to reach out to their fellow conservatives in Iran; and in 1991, both countries feared Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. By contrast, there is no common bogeyman threatening both countries today.

As such, the agreement is more analogous to a temporary ceasefire than to the durable Arab-Israeli agreements that the US has brokered. For example, in 1969, Nasser mediated an accord between Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization, granting them a fixed area of operations against Israel.

But six years later, the Palestinians were at war with Lebanon’s Christian factions. Similarly, in February 1994, King Hussein of Jordan brokered a deal between feuding Yemeni leaders; but by May of that year, one faction had seceded, leading to a brief civil war.

As an aspiring hegemon and regional player, China hopes its newfound diplomatic clout will enhance its military might. But the Persian Gulf is still an American sea.

The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, and America’s regional military operations are run out of Qatar. Notwithstanding MBS’ hostility towards Biden, Saudi Arabia still hosts around 2,700 US troops and has no plans to welcome a Chinese contingent.

These countries have opened their doors to America not only because they want access to US-made advanced weapons, but also because they have faith in American security guarantees. As long as the US continues to provide these advantages, it can box out China.

Some pundits think MBS is pursuing Nasser’s policy of pitting the Americans against their archrival (first the Soviets, now the Chinese). But he is more like Rick Blaine’s jilted lover in Casablanca.

She brings a Nazi to Blaine’s club to make him jealous, but soon opts for the Free French once her date and his friends seek to impose their will on her. MBS – or his successors – will likewise return to America’s side once the Saudis realise that, rather than alleviating their existential fears, embracing China leaves them beholden to its whims. - FMT

 

Barak Barfi is a former research fellow at New America and a former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.