How Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan Coalition Failed To Deliver, And What It Needs To Do In Opposition

By being ambivalent, even somewhat hesitant, toward pro-Malay policies, PH exposed itself to the stigma of being “anti-Malay”. Yes, it was maligned as a phantom threat in many ways because PH sincerely maintained it would look out for all, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has been unfairly demonised because it is a convenient bogey. But being painted as a threat, whether real or fake, does not matter for stoking fear.

Hwok-Aun Lee, SCMP

Malaysia’s newly appointed Perikatan Nasional (PN) cabinet has vowed to inclusively serve all Malaysians. Any new government would, but the onus is greater on this administration.

Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s shrewd blend of interest group representation and some technocratic presence counterbalances the exclusivist “Malay unity” agenda that fomented the power grab that led to his appointment, and glosses over the lavish rewards given to Pakatan Harapan (PH) defectors populating this cabinet, whose crossover enabled the overthrow of PH.

To avoid rocking an already buffeted nation, the new government is expected to maintain major economic policies, but in light of the PN coalition’s roots we can expect some alteration of ethnic quotas and government contracts, and the reshuffling of top administrative and government-linked company posts. One key difference is that PN declares upfront that it upholds race-based policies.

Another reason for the continuity of economic policies – especially the pro-Malay agenda currently in the limelight – is that fundamentally, nothing changed under the PH coalition. The system mostly drifted on autopilot for the past 22 months while it was in power, continually providing opportunities but not effectively empowering the beneficiaries.

PH floundered in policy indecision. It generated expectations of sweeping equality that it simply could not deliver, to the chagrin of many urban voters, and shied away from commitments to Malay preferential policies, thus alienating the majority ethnic group.

Real waves of hope culminated on May 9, 2018, when PH stunningly secured Malaysia’s first change of government. The coalition addressed immediate concerns that cut across all groups by abolishing GST, tackling corruption, and initiating some institutional reforms.

But the PH effectively disbanded on more deep-seated and systemic matters that profoundly affect the Bumiputras, who constitute two-thirds of Malaysia, and that entail compromises between majority and minority groups.

PH’s 2018 election manifesto repeatedly promised Bumiputra development, with a special nod to Malays of Peninsular Malaysia. But upon taking power only one PH coalition member, the Bumiputra party PPBM, championed Bumiputra policies. The remaining coalition parties echoed the rhetoric of the Pakatan Rakyat days when, as the federal opposition, the coalition equated race-based policies with Umno’s corruption and patronage and hence refused to touch them. At the same time, PH did not manage minority expectations for the system to be dismantled – and, of course, it could not deliver.

Many of the hopes of non-Malays proved ethereal; they were simply not achievable in these circumstances. There was the occasional tokenism of one-off allocations, such as matriculation college spaces, but PH failed to address the bigger picture and to temper expectations. The coalition did not articulate that numerous policies already operated for safeguarding equality, basic rights and basic needs, and it did not cohere around an agenda that recognised the existing magnitude and continuing imperative of Malay-targeted programmes, particularly the crucial need to develop capability and broaden participation.

PH persistently subscribes to “need-based affirmative action” as an indisputably good and complete alternative for race-based, pro-Malay affirmative action. Helping the poor, the argument goes, gives assurance to the Malays that their interests remain protected. This stance remains profusely, unthinkingly propagated.

It is rational for Malays to be unnerved by the prospect that opportunities once provided to them, as Malays, will be replaced by a formless notion of assistance for the poor. Such anxieties do not simply derive from primal fears or vested interests of a “Malay elite”, as popularly presumed. These presumptions erroneously overlook the vast array of race-based programmes extending opportunities to ordinary Malays – poor and non-poor – in technical and vocational education, university admissions and sponsorship, government contracting, microfinance, SME funding, business training, and much more.

By being ambivalent, even somewhat hesitant, toward pro-Malay policies, PH exposed itself to the stigma of being “anti-Malay”. Yes, it was maligned as a phantom threat in many ways because PH sincerely maintained it would look out for all, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has been unfairly demonised because it is a convenient bogey. But being painted as a threat, whether real or fake, does not matter for stoking fear.

Is there another way?

It is rather clichéd to speak of narratives, but there truly is a void in Malaysia today. A new narrative can bring clarity and foster cohesion by upholding two elements.

First, guarantee equality and justice for all – and specify where these principles apply. Many policies are already in place to safeguard the interests of majority and minority groups. There is no need for a policy overhaul, but Malaysians do need to hear assurances that the system looks out for them on many levels, regardless of their identity. The provisions include universal primary and secondary (including vernacular) schooling, public health care, a minimum wage, social transfers and subsidies, transport and infrastructure. Many of these programmes can give preference to the poor.

Second, commit to pursuing fair distribution and broad participation, primarily on pro-Malay/Bumiputra policies, but also those that target distinct ethnic, gender, or regional groups. The scope of these interventions must also be specified: higher education, employment in the public sector and government-linked companies, SME development, public procurement, and wealth ownership. Listing them informs public consciousness on an issue that is habitually shrouded in ambiguity, and shows that this national endeavour and continual burden does not primarily involve poverty alleviation, but also focuses on upward mobility, capability and participation of specific groups.

The discourse must jettison the false notion that the system only helps the elite. A policy rethink must recognise how extensive and embedded the system is, and how it must work more effectively in empowering a critical mass of Malays and Bumiputras.

PH remains in a credible position to articulate this new national narrative, and now that it is back in opposition, perhaps will have more time and impetus to thrash it out.