How Asean must straddle the US-China gap

 When the South China Sea rivalry is structural, US-China relations will always remain acute.

The latest clashes between the coast guards of China and the Philippines at the start of the Asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 20 once again demonstrate an enduring geopolitical reality: the South China Sea is no longer merely a maritime dispute.

It has become a structural feature of international politics.

Consequently, relations between the United States and China will remain acute regardless of periodic diplomatic breakthroughs or high-level summits.

The South China Sea occupies a unique place in the Indo-Pacific or Asia Pacific.

More than one-third of global maritime trade passes through these waters, making them indispensable to the global economy.

Rich fisheries, energy resources and vital sea lanes add further strategic importance.

Yet the competition is no longer primarily about fish, oil or natural gas. It is fundamentally about strategic influence, military positioning, and the future regional order.

For China, the South China Sea represents a core national interest tied to sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime security.

Beijing views many of the disputed features as integral to its historical claims and increasingly regards the surrounding waters as essential to its long-term national defence.

China’s expanding naval capabilities, coast guard operations and island infrastructure reflect this strategic calculation.

For the United States, the South China Sea represents an equally fundamental interest. Washington has consistently maintained that freedom of navigation, open commerce and respect for international law are indispensable to regional stability.

Through its alliances with the Philippines, Japan and Australia, alongside growing security cooperation with Southeast Asian partners, the United States seeks to preserve a maritime order that prevents any single power from dominating these waters.

These two strategic visions are difficult to reconcile because neither side believes it can compromise without weakening its long-term position.

This explains why even relatively minor maritime incidents quickly become major diplomatic crises. Encounters involving coast guard vessels, water cannons or close naval manoeuvres immediately trigger responses from Washington and Beijing.

Such incidents are never viewed in isolation. Each becomes another indicator of the broader balance of power between two global competitors.

The rivalry is therefore structural rather than episodic.

Unlike disputes that can be resolved through negotiation alone, structural competition arises from shifts in the international distribution of power.

As China continues to rise and the United States seeks to preserve its strategic leadership, both powers inevitably encounter one another in critical theatres such as the South China Sea. Individual crises may subside, but the underlying competition remains.

Domestic politics reinforce this reality.

Chinese leaders face strong nationalist expectations to defend territorial claims without appearing to yield to external pressure.

American administrations, regardless of party, also face bipartisan expectations to reassure allies and demonstrate continued commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

Political constraints therefore narrow the room for major concessions on both sides.

At the same time, advances in military technology have intensified strategic competition. Malaysia plans to have cyber security as its fourth division.

Artificial intelligence, satellite surveillance, autonomous maritime systems, cyber capabilities and long-range precision weapons increasingly shape military planning.

The South China Sea has become a laboratory for 21st-century strategic competition rather than simply a contested maritime space.

This places Asean in an exceptionally delicate position.

Asean does not seek to choose between Washington and Beijing.

Instead, it strives to preserve Asean centrality by engaging all major powers while maintaining regional autonomy. This balancing role becomes increasingly difficult whenever tensions escalate.

Yet Asean’s diplomatic architecture remains indispensable. The Asean Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus and negotiations on a South China Sea code of conduct continue to provide valuable channels for dialogue and confidence-building.

While these mechanisms cannot eliminate rivalry, they can reduce misunderstanding and lower the risks of unintended escalation.

That distinction is crucial.

History shows that structural rivalries are seldom resolved quickly. They are managed through sustained diplomacy, deterrence and institutional engagement.

Temporary periods of détente should therefore be welcomed, but they should not be mistaken for permanent solutions. Improved communication can reduce immediate risks without altering the strategic realities that continue to drive competition.

As long as the South China Sea remains central to the Indo-Pacific balance of power, relations between China and the United States will continue to experience recurring periods of tension.

The challenge before Asean is not to eliminate this rivalry — an impossible task — but to ensure that it remains governed by diplomacy rather than confrontation.

That is why Asean centrality matters today more than ever.

In an era of structural competition between the world’s two leading powers, it remains Southeast Asia’s best hope for preserving peace, stability and strategic equilibrium. - FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.