Kuan Yew and the Malay position - Chandra Muzaffar

ONE MAN'S VIEW: By installing Stamford Raffles as its founder, Singapore marginalised its intimate link to the Johor-Riau sultanate

LEE Kuan Yew's (LKY) Malaysia A Different Path in his One Man's View of the World is important for a simple reason. It is a reflection of how an overwhelming majority of Chinese Malaysians and a sizeable number of Indian Malaysians feel about Malaysia. It is this feeling that expressed itself through the ballot box on May 5.

For these Malaysians, the greatest threat to inter-ethnic unity and harmony is Malay dominance. LKY alludes to "dominance of one race" (p. 162). He argues that when Singapore was part of Malaysia between 1963 and 1965, he fought for a "truly multiracial country", a Malaysian Malaysia.

As he puts it in his book, "We had to go by the Constitution, which did not say that it was a Malay Malaysia but a Malaysian Malaysia." (p. 160)

True, the Malaysian Constitution does not create a Malay nation if by that we mean an exclusive Malay entity. By conferring citizenship upon millions of non-Malays between 1948 and 1957, Malaya, later Malaysia, was destined to be a multi-ethnic nation.

Indeed, it was the Malay leadership itself, specifically the Umno elite, that decided, for a variety of reasons, that citizenship, including jus soli (the automatic right of anyone born in a particular territory to citizenship), should be extended to the non-Malays.

If the Constitution embodies the concept of multi-ethnic citizenship while guaranteeing equality before the law for all Malaysians (Article 8), does it also endorse the idea of a Malaysian Malaysia as envisaged by LKY?

All the states in the Malay peninsula and Singapore had their genesis in these sultanates. By acknowledging the role of the sultans, albeit as constitutional monarchs, the Constitution is emphasising the significance of historical continuity in the identity of the nation.

LKY has never been comfortable with this as illustrated by a paragraph from his latest book. He writes, "Between 1963 and 1965, as prime minister of Singapore, I had to attend meetings of the Council (sic) of Rulers in Malaysia.

"The rulers who attended would all be Malays, dressed in uniforms and accompanied by their sword bearers. All the chief ministers had their traditional Malay dresses on and I was the sole exception. This was not mere symbolism. It was to drive home the point: this is a Malay country. Never should you forget that." (p. 160).

LKY as prime minister of the independent state of Singapore installed the British colonial administrator, Stamford Raffles, as its founder.

It marginalised the island's intimate link to the Johor-Riau sultanate and the larger Malay world.

By making Raffles the founder of Singapore, LKY was strengthening the myth of discovery, which is so much a part of colonial psychological domination.

His position on the other even more powerful expression of Malay identity, namely Islam, tells us a great deal about the man's utter lack of understanding of what the religion means to its followers. Noting that Malaysia "will be a Malay-Muslim country", he laments, "Once upon a time they were relaxed -- they used to serve liquor at dinners and drink with you -- now they toast each other in syrups." (pp. 171-2).

For the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Malaysia and elsewhere, observing what is explicitly prohibited in the religion would be seen as "righteous conduct".

On the other hand, those who transgress prohibitions -- such as consuming liquor -- are invariably viewed as people lacking in moral probity.

This perception of right and wrong among Muslims -- contrary to what LKY appears to suggest -- has not made them less relaxed or less "open to new ideas" (p. 171), as demonstrated by the attitudes and actions of millions of Muslims right through history.

LKY's misconceptions are perhaps even starker when it comes to the special position of the Malays in the Constitution. In denouncing "race-based" and "discriminatory policies", he forgets that it was not simply because the vast majority of Malays were abysmally poor in the early 1960s -- 64 per cent lived below the poverty line -- that affirmative action was justified.

Some form of preferential treatment had become absolutely necessary because a huge number of non-Malays became citizens, a segment of whom was economically much better endowed and, therefore, more capable of enhancing its position in a market economy.

The accommodation of the non-Malays on such a massive scale had given rise to an extraordinary situation with very few parallels or precedents in history. A people whose identity defined the land -- Tanah Melayu -- had been relegated to a community among communities. It is from this perspective that one should try to understand not only the articles pertaining to special position in the Constitution, but also the position of the Malay rulers, the Malay language and Islam.

Collectively, they constitute the Malay position. The Malay position, as I once argued in a seminar in Singapore in 1973, was "compensation" for the community since it never became a nation-state on its own.

LKY made no attempt to understand this when Singapore was part of Malaysia. When one reads his reflections on Malaysia in 2013 -- 48 years after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia -- it is apparent that his thinking has remained wrapped in that lop-sided, communally biased cocoon that displays so little empathy for the Malays, their accommodation of the non-Malays, the subsequent relegation of their status and the complexities of building a united nation out of this unique matrix.

If LKY had developed some empathy for the "Malay Other", he could have emerged as an effective inter-ethnic bridge-builder conveying Malay sentiments to the non-Malays and, at the same time, transmitting their legitimate aspirations to the Malays. This mutual understanding would have reinforced relations between the communities and helped to develop a cohesive nation. Instead, he chose to be an ethnic hero

- nst.com.my