That Singapore’s PAP government did not want Pakatan Rakyat to win Malaysia’s 13th general election could be deduced from a little known non-event that went unreported on polling day.
Bus 170 that plies between Causeway Point in Singapore and Larkin in Johor Baru was not on its normal run on May 5.
On a normal day, every few minutes one bus 170 takes off from Larkin and heads south of the causeway. Simultaneously, another bus of the same number heads north, for Larkin, from Causeway Point.
On May 5, the bus 170 service was a no-show. Presumably, Malaysian voters working and residing in Singapore must have relied on other means to come across to the peninsula to cast their vote.
It was said eligible Malaysian voters, reportedly 300,000 of them resident in Singapore, came in large numbers, many as early as the Friday before Sunday’s vote, and were quickly into queues that formed outside polling stations early on the morning of May 5, to mark their ballots before making their way back to Singapore.
Their return from Singapore in droves helped boost voter turnout to 82 percent of the 13.1 million on the Election Commission’s register - the highest turnout since the 1969 polls.
The Singapore government was quick to congratulate the Najib Abdul Razak administration on their victory the day after the ballot while their counterparts in the region took their time to assess reports filed by their embassies before joining in the congratulatory round.
If Pakatan supremo Anwar Ibrahim is to be believed, Indonesia president Bambang Yudhoyono who Anwar was invited to meet in Bali in mid-June, in conversation with his Malaysian guest, pronounced himself stupefied at the extent of the fraud that had taken place in the May 5 polls.
Singapore’s alacrity in congratulating the Najib government reflected its relief at the results of the election: a victory for Pakatan in Malaysia would have been ominous for the prospects of continued PAP rule in Singapore.
Bus 170 that plies between Causeway Point in Singapore and Larkin in Johor Baru was not on its normal run on May 5.
On a normal day, every few minutes one bus 170 takes off from Larkin and heads south of the causeway. Simultaneously, another bus of the same number heads north, for Larkin, from Causeway Point.
On May 5, the bus 170 service was a no-show. Presumably, Malaysian voters working and residing in Singapore must have relied on other means to come across to the peninsula to cast their vote.It was said eligible Malaysian voters, reportedly 300,000 of them resident in Singapore, came in large numbers, many as early as the Friday before Sunday’s vote, and were quickly into queues that formed outside polling stations early on the morning of May 5, to mark their ballots before making their way back to Singapore.
Their return from Singapore in droves helped boost voter turnout to 82 percent of the 13.1 million on the Election Commission’s register - the highest turnout since the 1969 polls.
The Singapore government was quick to congratulate the Najib Abdul Razak administration on their victory the day after the ballot while their counterparts in the region took their time to assess reports filed by their embassies before joining in the congratulatory round.
If Pakatan supremo Anwar Ibrahim is to be believed, Indonesia president Bambang Yudhoyono who Anwar was invited to meet in Bali in mid-June, in conversation with his Malaysian guest, pronounced himself stupefied at the extent of the fraud that had taken place in the May 5 polls.
Singapore’s alacrity in congratulating the Najib government reflected its relief at the results of the election: a victory for Pakatan in Malaysia would have been ominous for the prospects of continued PAP rule in Singapore.
Kuan Yew's many doubts
Now, three months after the election, Singapore’s progenitor Lee Kuan Yew comes out with the justification for their policy of ‘better the devil you know than the angel you don’t’ with regard to the competition in Malaysian politics between incumbents BN and rivals Pakatan.
In a just released book disarmingly titled ‘One Man’s View of the World’, Lee gave his views on political developments in Malaysia after the seminal election of March 2008 which saw BN lose their customary two-thirds majority.
Lee expressed strong skepticism about the viability of two significant features of the post-2008 Malaysian political scenario: Prime Minister Najib’s 1Malaysia policy and Pakatan’s agenda of multiracialism.
He said Najib’s formulation was dead in the water because of Malay opposition to what the 1Malaysia policy would have been under the PM’s initial promptings – a gradual dismantling of racial quotas.
Lee was similarly dubious about the prospects for success of Pakatan’s multiracialism which he predicted would wither under the pressure to maintain Malay supremacy once the coalition took power.
To those familiar with Lee’s views on Malaysia and Singapore over the past half century at least, the latest version of his opinions may strike as added justification for his behavior in the period between the PAP’s decision to contest the elections in Malaysia in April 1964 and the expulsion of Singapore from the federation in August 1965.
That span of time, between April 1964 and August the following year, saw a transformation in Lee from eager enthusiast of the Malaya-Singapore merger, which took place in September 1963, to insidious doubter of its viability.
Lee would like his story to be believed that Singapore’s expulsion was due to his refusal to accept Malay supremacy. His adversaries contend that the expulsion was due to his wanting to become numero uno in Malaysia.
The jury is still out on this issue. In fact, the question may not ever yield in a satisfactory resolution and that could be put down to the inescapability of ambiguity and indeterminateness in human affairs.
Fecundity of the unexpected
Still, it’s hard to abandon faith in the axiom that the truth will out at last. Anyway, shards of it keep protruding, rather inconveniently, all the time.
Such as former Sabah state secretary Simon Sipaun’s disclosure in recent times that he was present with Donald Stephens in an meeting sometime in 1965 with Lee Kuan Yew when the latter told Stephens that he would be deputy premier in a government headed by Lee should things soon go the PAP way in Malaysia.
Suffice, from the Lee standpoint, Pakatan’s multiracialism must be shown to be a non-starter, not only because its success bodes ill for the longevity of PAP rule in Singapore, but also because it would retrospectively undermine the version that Lee wants put out on the reasons for Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 – his refusal to accept Malay supremacy.
Only a starry-eyed optimist would bet the house on Pakatan staying cohesive and true to its agenda of a more egalitarian Malaysia once it takes power.
But then, at one time, pessimists would not countenance the view that the Malay vote was detachable from Umno. And also, that a secular DAP would be able to collaborate with a theocratic Pas in a partnership that has now lasted five years.
Both unexpected developments have occurred in Malaysian politics.
Credit both developments to the fecundity of the unexpected, something that would not surprise those with a belief in improvisation as perhaps the greatest of human gifts.
The ability to evaluate a situation and come up with an entirely new way of dealing with it is integral to the human propensity to work on alternatives when cul de sacs loom.
The limit in the vision of leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, now poised on the start of his tenth decade in an otherwise accomplished life, is that they do not like surprises, the unexpected, and the inventively improvisatory.
Now, three months after the election, Singapore’s progenitor Lee Kuan Yew comes out with the justification for their policy of ‘better the devil you know than the angel you don’t’ with regard to the competition in Malaysian politics between incumbents BN and rivals Pakatan.
In a just released book disarmingly titled ‘One Man’s View of the World’, Lee gave his views on political developments in Malaysia after the seminal election of March 2008 which saw BN lose their customary two-thirds majority.
Lee expressed strong skepticism about the viability of two significant features of the post-2008 Malaysian political scenario: Prime Minister Najib’s 1Malaysia policy and Pakatan’s agenda of multiracialism.He said Najib’s formulation was dead in the water because of Malay opposition to what the 1Malaysia policy would have been under the PM’s initial promptings – a gradual dismantling of racial quotas.
Lee was similarly dubious about the prospects for success of Pakatan’s multiracialism which he predicted would wither under the pressure to maintain Malay supremacy once the coalition took power.
To those familiar with Lee’s views on Malaysia and Singapore over the past half century at least, the latest version of his opinions may strike as added justification for his behavior in the period between the PAP’s decision to contest the elections in Malaysia in April 1964 and the expulsion of Singapore from the federation in August 1965.
That span of time, between April 1964 and August the following year, saw a transformation in Lee from eager enthusiast of the Malaya-Singapore merger, which took place in September 1963, to insidious doubter of its viability.
Lee would like his story to be believed that Singapore’s expulsion was due to his refusal to accept Malay supremacy. His adversaries contend that the expulsion was due to his wanting to become numero uno in Malaysia.
The jury is still out on this issue. In fact, the question may not ever yield in a satisfactory resolution and that could be put down to the inescapability of ambiguity and indeterminateness in human affairs.
Fecundity of the unexpected
Still, it’s hard to abandon faith in the axiom that the truth will out at last. Anyway, shards of it keep protruding, rather inconveniently, all the time.
Such as former Sabah state secretary Simon Sipaun’s disclosure in recent times that he was present with Donald Stephens in an meeting sometime in 1965 with Lee Kuan Yew when the latter told Stephens that he would be deputy premier in a government headed by Lee should things soon go the PAP way in Malaysia.
Suffice, from the Lee standpoint, Pakatan’s multiracialism must be shown to be a non-starter, not only because its success bodes ill for the longevity of PAP rule in Singapore, but also because it would retrospectively undermine the version that Lee wants put out on the reasons for Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 – his refusal to accept Malay supremacy.
Only a starry-eyed optimist would bet the house on Pakatan staying cohesive and true to its agenda of a more egalitarian Malaysia once it takes power.But then, at one time, pessimists would not countenance the view that the Malay vote was detachable from Umno. And also, that a secular DAP would be able to collaborate with a theocratic Pas in a partnership that has now lasted five years.
Both unexpected developments have occurred in Malaysian politics.
Credit both developments to the fecundity of the unexpected, something that would not surprise those with a belief in improvisation as perhaps the greatest of human gifts.
The ability to evaluate a situation and come up with an entirely new way of dealing with it is integral to the human propensity to work on alternatives when cul de sacs loom.
The limit in the vision of leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, now poised on the start of his tenth decade in an otherwise accomplished life, is that they do not like surprises, the unexpected, and the inventively improvisatory.
TERENCE NETTO has been a journalist for close on four decades. He likes the occupation because it puts him in contact with the eminent without being under the necessity to admire them. It is the ideal occupation for a temperament that finds power fascinating and its exercise abhorrent.
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