I am writing in response to R Paneir Selvam’s recent article “Halting terrorism: Lessons from global Ramadan attacks”.
While Selvam's concern for regional security is commendable, his analysis fundamentally mischaracterises the southern Thailand insurgency. This is not merely a matter of differing opinions but of factual context that requires correction.
As specialists in this field, we must ensure public discourse rests on accurate analysis, particularly when complex conflicts risk being misconstrued in ways that could lead to counterproductive policies.
Historical context matters
The conflict in Thailand's southern border provinces cannot be understood outside its historical context. The insurgency's roots lie in the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty that transferred the former Malay-Muslim Patani sultanate to Thai (then Siamese) control.
This created a distinctive Malay-Muslim minority region in a predominantly Thai-Buddhist state, setting the stage for tensions that have periodically erupted into violence. The current phase of conflict, which began in 2004, represents a continuation of these historical grievances rather than a new phenomenon inspired by global jihadist movements.
The primary insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), seeks to establish "Patani Darussalam" independent from Thailand's Buddhist-majority governance. Their demands focus on political autonomy, cultural recognition, and addressing perceived injustices; not implementing religious law or joining a global caliphate.
Contemporary analysis increasingly views the conflict not as a matter of Malay supremacy but as a broader contestation over "Thainess" and national identity; a struggle for rights and recognition within the Thai state rather than a rejection of the Thai state system itself.
This evolving understanding distinguishes the southern Thailand insurgency from the jihadist terrorism seen in other contexts.
Debunking the extremism frame
The frequent characterisation of the southern Thailand conflict as religious extremism linked to groups like the Islamic State (Isis) represents a fundamental misunderstanding of its nature. Despite over two decades of conflict, there is no credible evidence linking BRN to Isis or other international jihadist networks.
The insurgency's tactics, targeting patterns, and objectives remain focused on the specific goal of autonomy or independence for the Patani region.
The March 2025 attacks primarily targeted government facilities, security forces and infrastructure. Even when religious sites have been targeted in the past, closer analysis typically reveals political motivations rather than religious hatred.
Insurgent operations consistently focus on symbols of Thai state authority rather than random civilian or international sites, a targeting pattern that distinguishes the southern Thailand conflict from global jihadist movements and reflects political rather than ideological goals.
The religious extremism framing leads to counterproductive policy responses by emphasising security measures over political engagement.
By misdiagnosing the conflict as primarily motivated by religious ideology rather than a political struggle against systematic human rights violations and political marginalisation, policymakers risk perpetuating the very violence they seek to end.
The problematic Ramadan conflation
Using Ramadan as a framework for analysing insurgent violence is particularly ill-advised and analytically unsound. Attempts to connect violence in southern Thailand with unrelated incidents in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Bangladesh during Ramadan create a false analytical framework that obscures rather than illuminates the conflict's dynamics.
This Ramadan conflation suffers from several fundamental flaws. First, it imposes a religion-centric analysis of what is primarily a conflict about self-determination with specific political grievances.
By emphasising Ramadan timing while ignoring political context such as the 13-month negotiation stalemate, it misidentifies the driving factors behind tactical decisions.
Second, it creates artificial connections between unrelated conflicts with different histories, actors, and motivations. The southern Thailand insurgency bears little resemblance to Isis-orchestrated attacks in the Middle East beyond superficial temporal coincidence.
The conflation ignores the fact that Isis explicitly claimed and coordinated its Ramadan attacks as part of a global campaign, whereas BRN has never made such claims or shown alignment with Isis objectives.
Third, it essentialises Islam by suggesting violence is inherently tied to religious observance rather than specific political contexts. This perpetuates harmful stereotypes while contributing nothing to understanding conflict dynamics.
Finally, focusing on Ramadan diverts attention from the actual strategic calculations underlying violence, particularly how it relates to the peace process deadlock, and can lead to misguided policy responses that neglect political solutions.
Political stalemate, not religious extremism
Recent violence in Thailand's Deep South coincides with a 13-month suspension of peace talks between the Thai government and BRN representatives. This timing is strategic, not coincidental. The Thai government has failed to appoint a chief negotiator since the position was vacated in October 2024, effectively stalling the peace process.
Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has publicly stated that Thailand demands "a ceasefire before negotiations," creating a procedural impasse that BRN appears unwilling to accept.
Civil society organisations in the region have explicitly linked the violence to this breakdown in negotiations. The Duay Jai Association chairperson noted that "earlier incidents of burning electricity poles or putting up (protest) signs already reflected dissatisfaction, but the government remained passive toward these signals without any response".
The Cross Cultural Foundation has similarly identified "the refusal to appoint a head of the peace dialogue team while violent situations are significantly increasing" as a "direct cause" of the escalation.
The March attacks occurred during Ramadan, but this timing appears related to political calculations rather than religious motivations. Attribution of violence to religious fervour ignores the strategic logic behind the insurgency's actions and obscures the political solutions necessary to address the conflict.
The strategic logic of insurgent violence
The recent attacks demonstrate a calculated escalation tied directly to the peace process stalemate. This escalation follows a predictable pattern in asymmetric conflicts where non-state actors seek to overcome negotiation deadlocks through force.
With Thai authorities demanding violence reduction as a precondition while insurgents view this as a negotiable outcome, the resulting strategic divergence has created space for tactical escalation as a means to influence the political process.
In the political calculus of the insurgency, violence becomes a rational means to influence the stalled political process.
The March 2025 operations show significant tactical sophistication, including the use of diverse weapons, multi-location coordination, and sequential attacks designed to maximise pressure on security forces.
These capabilities reflect the insurgency's operational evolution rather than external influence from international terrorist groups.
For instance, the targeting of police officers on teacher-protection duty, government facilities, and infrastructure represents a strategic choice to pressure the Thai state while minimising international condemnation. This approach suggests politically calculated violence rather than religiously motivated terrorism.
Effective responses beyond securitisation
The security-focused approach advocated by many commentators has proven insufficient over two decades of conflict. Enhanced border security, surveillance technologies, and intelligence-sharing have their place but cannot resolve the underlying political grievances driving the insurgency.
Selvam's recommendations regarding Malaysian security measures and deradicalisation programs reveal a concerning unfamiliarity with existing frameworks. Malaysia already maintains robust security protocols in urban environments and has invested significantly in counter-terrorism preparedness.
If anything, the challenge may be over-securitisation rather than a lack of readiness. This is particularly evident in Malaysia's suite of broad counterterrorism laws which, while intended for security purposes, have raised concerns about being potentially repressive.
Furthermore, Malaysia has long been recognised for its deradicalisation programs, which have been operational even before the emergence of Isis to counter the now-dissolved Jemaah Islamiyah and continue to receive substantial resource allocation.
Selvam's suggestion to "allocate resources towards initiatives that focus on de-radicalisation” implies an absence where robust systems already exist.
This recommendation demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of the BRN insurgency itself. The grievances driving this conflict are fundamentally political, centred on the right to self-determination.
They cannot be effectively addressed through the existing PCVE approach and deradicalisation programmes designed for jihadist extremism.
Such programmes have limited applicability to addressing the core issues of autonomy, cultural recognition and political representation that actually motivate the southern Thailand insurgency.
More effective responses would include revitalising the peace process by appointing a chief negotiator, resuming substantive dialogue without preconditions and implementing political reforms that address legitimate grievances regarding cultural recognition, language rights and local autonomy.
They would also include working with Malaysia as a facilitator rather than merely a security partner; and strengthening civil society organisations that can bridge divides and represent community concerns.
Why it matters?
The conflict in Thailand's Deep South is fundamentally political, not religious. The recent violence reflects a calculated response to a stalled peace process rather than religious extremism or international terrorist influence.
By accurately understanding the nature of the conflict, policymakers can develop more effective responses that address root causes rather than symptoms.
Framing the insurgency as "extremism" linked to Isis or even religion not only misrepresents reality but leads to counterproductive policies that may prolong rather than resolve the conflict.
A more effective approach would recognise the political dimension of the violence and prioritise revitalising the peace process alongside necessary security measures.
For regional stakeholders, including Malaysia, understanding this context is crucial for developing appropriate responses that contribute to long-term stability rather than reactive security measures that fail to address underlying causes. The path to peace lies through political engagement, not security theatre. - Mkini
MUNIRA MUSTAFFA is the executive director and principal consultant of Chasseur Group, specialising in emerging threats and non-traditional security challenges.
The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT.
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