Thai-Cambodian clash: proxy conflicts and the threat to Asean

Inter-state disputes can lead to geopolitical manoeuvring through security partnerships, arms sales and diplomatic backing.

From Julia Roknifard

Proxy wars are typically conflicts fought elsewhere by others, with the aim of limiting risks and costs.

For Southeast Asia and Asean this means the imminent clash of great powers over the region’s vital trade routes and resources. with the Thai-Cambodian conflict having the potential to escalate these tensions.

On the surface, Thai-Cambodian tensions are rooted in longstanding territorial disputes and nationalist sentiments but was in a frozen state until recently for reasons that remain obscured. Some observers would cite domestic power struggles but that is up for debate.

In fact, such a conflict presents the means for geopolitical manoeuvring through security partnerships, arms sales and diplomatic backing that can harden positions rather than resolve disputes and a localised grievance could develop into something with broader security implications.

This will not be the first time a proxy conflict is fought in Southeast Asia. The long and tragic Vietnam War was one of the Cold War’s bloodiest proxy wars, with devastating consequences that lasted generations.

The war destabilised the entire region, contributed to refugee crises across Asean states, harmed regional integration and development, and came at a terrible human cost. Vietnam has since achieved huge economic development thanks largely to a lack of inter-state warfare which has lasted till the present.

Today’s geopolitical environment is different from the first Cold War. Instead of ideological blocs, competition now revolves around trade routes, supply chains, technology dominance and maritime control.

This is evident in the South China Sea, where overlapping claims and military posturing intersect. A potential clash between the Philippines and China would not remain a contained bilateral dispute.

Any escalation would invite outside involvement whether through alliance obligations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the US, requiring both nations to defend each other from armed attacks and the follow-on 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for US troop rotations and access to Philippine bases. The implications for regional stability would be severe.

Equally critical is the Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s narrowest and most heavily used maritime chokepoints. The potential disruption of the straits or the South China Sea trade routes would have a knock-on effect, strangling the export-oriented countries in the region which are already reeling from trade disruptions and fragmentation of global trade links.

The recent attacks on civilian shipping in various regions offer a disturbing development that could surface here as Thailand has ordered a sea blockade to prevent oil and other strategic goods from reaching Cambodia.

Asean was created for situations exactly like this with an emphasis on mediation and conflict management. This was effectively demonstrated by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim who has worked repeatedly to get both parties to the table.

The breakdown of the ceasefire should not be taken as discouragement, but the influence of external powers must be acknowledged. It is for Asean to work within the platform to keep such influences at bay while securing the region, and it is not the job for a single country leader alone.

Its 11-member states must realise its full potential as a formalised grouping that wields collective power. There are several active conflicts in the region, but these are low-level internal disputes while the Thai-Cambodian conflict is an interstate clash.

The implications are far deeper and more dangerous, especially if the conflict is prolonged and turns into a massive disruption that destroys economic activity, generates refugees and creates lawless conditions. The conflict could be internationalised by external forces, adding to its scope and danger to regional development and stability.

A collective security framework must be developed and strengthened with part of it aimed at internal crisis to focus on conflict prevention and de-escalation. Joint monitoring mechanisms, shared early-warning systems and standing mediation bodies could help defuse tensions before they spiral into armed confrontation.

Regional disputes should be resolved on Asean-led platforms, especially a joint observation and peacekeeping force, with all efforts made to prevent the internationalisation of conflicts within the grouping.

Establishing a formalised shared command for border security and maritime governance are required to deal with varied low-intensity threats including transnational crime, piracy, human trafficking and illegal fishing in addition to standardised legal frameworks would strengthen state capacity without provoking external entanglements.

Such structures will be invaluable in effective coordination of disaster management too. The recent floods across Asean have exposed the limits of ad hoc and unfocused responses to crises that are inherently regional in scale and impact. Climate change, pandemics and environmental degradation pose threats as severe as traditional security risks.

Economic security, energy and food security must be also recognised as inseparable from regional stability. Protecting trade routes, ensuring supply-chain continuity and reducing vulnerability to external shocks are in the interest of all members. Asean-led mechanisms to safeguard critical infrastructure and maritime corridors would reduce the temptation for external powers to intervene.

Asean must move away from its old model and make the transition into a more capable and coordinated grouping that can effectively take on regional challenges instead of each member fending for itself. It can remain fragmented, reactive and vulnerable to becoming a proxy theatre for others’ rivalries, or it can take deliberate steps toward collective security rooted in regional ownership.

The Thai-Cambodian conflict will test the grouping to its limits but likely it will be far from the only regional crisis in the near term.

Julia Roknifard is a senior lecturer at the School of Law and Governance at Taylor’s University and lectures at the newly launched programme ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economics’.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.