Perlis crisis reinforces the need for law reform

A host of constitutional and political dilemmas have emerged to demand attention and reckoning.

From Shad Saleem Faruqi

In the general election on Nov 19, 2022, Perikatan Nasional (PN) won an overwhelming 14 out of 15 state assembly seats in Perlis. PAS assemblyman Shukri Ramli was sworn in as the chief minister of the state.

However, the near-clean sweep by PAS did not last the whole five-year term. On Dec 22, 2025 – slightly more than three years after the state assembly was first summoned on Dec 19, 2022 – eight Perlis assemblymen submitted statutory declarations (SDs) to the Raja of Perlis, expressing their loss of confidence in Shukri. The eight comprised five assemblymen from Bersatu and three from PAS.

The SDs eventually led to the collapse of the PAS-led government and its replacement by a Bersatu-led administration. A host of constitutional and political dilemmas also rose to the surface, emerging from the shadows to demand attention and reckoning.

Casual vacancy

The three PAS assemblymen who signed SDs were penalised by their party. A provision in the PAS constitution was invoked to cease their membership of the party.

PAS then wrote to the speaker of the Perlis assembly that the termination of their memberships attracted Article 50A(1)(a)(ii) of the Perlis constitution. The article stipulates that an assemblyman shall cease to be a member of the assembly if he ceases to be a member of his political party or coalition. His seat shall become immediately vacant on a date on which the speaker determines that a “casual vacancy” is established under Clause (3).

Expulsion from party

To rebut the above contention, the three assemblymen could invoke Article 50A(2)(c) of the state constitution, which sets out that a member of the assembly shall not cease to be a member of the assembly only by reason of expulsion from his political party.

Under the 2022 anti-hopping law at the federal and state levels, expulsion from a party is not grounds for a loss of membership of the assembly and the creation of a casual vacancy.

Speaker’s discretion

On behalf of the three expelled assemblymen, it could also be argued that while under Article 50A(1) of the Perlis constitution, the discretion to establish a casual vacancy belongs to the speaker, such discretion is not, and cannot be, absolute.

The speaker is still bound by Article 50A(2) of the Perlis constitution – that expulsion from a party does not result in a casual vacancy.

The Perlis speaker seems to have given greater weightage to the PAS constitution than to Article 50A(2)(c) of the Perlis constitution.

The speaker seems to have relied wholesale on the decision by PAS leaders that the three assemblymen had ceased to be members of their party. The expelled members’ declaration that they did not resign from their party, or join another, and that they still owe loyalty to PAS, does not seem to have influenced the Perlis speaker.

By-elections

Are by-elections for the three constituencies previously held by the assemblymen – Chuping, Bintong and Guar Sanji – necessary?

The Perlis constitution in Article 55(5) mandates that if a casual vacancy arises in the assembly within the last two years of the five-year term, there is no need to fill the vacancy.

However, there is an important exception: if the speaker notifies the Election Commission (EC) in writing that the numerical strength of the party that constitutes a majority is being affected by such vacancy, then the vacancy must be filled with a by-election within 60 days.

The three assemblymen may submit to the court that the speaker has no legal basis to unilaterally advise the EC to call the by-elections for three reasons.

Firstly, there are no casual vacancies because of Article 50A(2)(c) on expulsion. Secondly, the Perlis assembly has less than two years left before the next election. Thirdly, the numerical strength of the present government is not in danger.

Judicial review

Do the courts have the power to review the above issues?

It is submitted that the courts are generally reluctant to interfere in any internal matter of parliamentary proceedings or privileges. But when jurisdictional or other constitutional issues arise, judicial review is a constitutional duty. Note the case of Gobind Singh Deo (2015) where the suspension of an MP for contempt was upheld, but not the withholding of his salary, as that is provided for by the law.

Subsequent to the 2022 constitutional amendments on party-hopping, a shift towards judicial justiciability is likely to arise. Matters such as party-hopping or defections, “ceasing to be a member of a party”, casual vacancies, and by-elections are not likely to be regarded as matters of an assembly’s internal proceedings but as constitutional questions with legal guidelines.

The speaker’s role will remain important but will probably no longer be constitutionally unbounded.

As to the issue of his unfettered, unreviewable discretion, I am reminded of the elegant statement by the late Lord President Raja Azlan Shah (as His Majesty was then) in the case of Sri Lempah Enterprises (1979) that “every discretion cannot be free from legal restraint; where it is wrongly exercised, it becomes the duty of the courts to intervene”.

We may also note the recent High Court decision on the Najib Razak addendum case, that even the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the exercise of the power of pardon under Article 42 of the Federal Constitution must act in accordance with constitutional prescriptions.

Conclusion

The Perlis crisis reinforces the need for removing some of the defects in the law on party-hopping.

Firstly, the distinction between expulsion from a party and “ceasing to be its member” must be clarified with illustrations. Is termination or forced resignation similar to expulsion? Is ceasing to be a member the result of a member’s own actions like resigning from the party, joining another, failure to pay subscriptions, criminal conviction, bankruptcy, etc?

Secondly, the anti-party hopping law should not apply for a short interim period (let us say two weeks after election) in case there is a hung parliament. If no one has an absolute majority in Parliament, then political parties or coalitions should be allowed to realign (but not hopping by individuals) in order to form a stable, unity government expeditiously. However, once a post-election government is in the saddle, the anti-party hopping law should have full force.

Thirdly, the Federal Constitution should be amended to put a ceiling on the number of ministers, deputy ministers, parliamentary secretaries and political secretaries that can be appointed at the federal level. State constitutions already provide the permissible upper limit of exco members, and the federal government should emulate the states on this point. - FMT

Shad Saleem Faruqi is principal research fellow at Universiti Malaya.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.