Malacca as theatre - Part 2

 

 The curtain has risen on Malacca’s 16th state election. On Nov 14, 687,697 voters will decide a result that will shape the state’s governance and set Malaysia on a political path of new political alignments.

A total of 79 candidates will contest 28 seats: 11 straight fights, 11 three-cornered contests and six four-cornered races.

Yet what is playing out in the election combines the backroom moves of a wayang kulit (shadow play), the familiar faces of a bangsawan (Malay opera) and Shakespeare’s telling of history.

Umno/BN’s deal-making boost

This electoral stage was set before the campaign through deals. In the run-up to the 2021 state polls, backroom deals to take over the government backfired. This election, the focus has been on deals over seats, setting the choices for voters.

Seat negotiations have long been part of Malaysia’s coalitions, but this round they have had greater intensity and are shaping new political alignments that will be assessed by voters.

Parties that fought each other in 2021 (and 2022) are now allies, and those partnered together in the national government are fighting each other.

As in a wayang kulit, the most decisive moves happened behind the screen: by the time voters even saw the figures on stage, the dalang had already placed them.

The seat deals favour Umno/BN. Negotiations have ensured that at least a third of the seats are straight fights between the more established parties.

The majority of these seats are held by Umno, including the seat of incumbent Chief Minister Ab Rauf Yusoh, Tanjung Bidara.

The seat was highly competitive in 2021, won only by a slim majority of 364 votes, and now is among the safest for the incumbent.

The chief minister has, in effect, staged his own scene so that the shadows fall in his favour.

The deal-boost effect is evident in the state as a whole. Umno/BN only needs 15 seats to secure government, and the deal-shaped seat line-up shows that it holds a significant advantage in more than 12 seats.

By opting not to let go of its 21 seats, and securing safer passage in half of these, Umno/BN has made its task of winning government much easier.

Unlike in Negeri Sembilan, Umno/BN is expected to be able to form a majority on its own.

Viability of BN-PN strategic partnership

One reason for this is the electoral success of the BN-Perikatan Nasional partnership among Malay voters. The Negeri Sembilan results point to the electoral strength of this relationship.

Like the warring houses of Shakespeare’s histories, yesterday’s rivals now share the stage; the question is whether their supporters follow them across it.

Past results show they emphatically do. Below are the findings of an analysis of the electoral transferability of support from traditional supporters of BN and PN based on the 2022 results and the outcomes of the 2026 Negeri Sembilan election, divided by ethnicity.

The findings show the percentage of the share that moved, and with smaller communities such as Orang Asli and others, small changes yield larger percentages.

The results of the smaller communities should not be overinterpreted, as they reflect a low share of the overall vote.

Shares over 100 percent indicate an expansion of the traditional political base of that community compared to the 2022 general election.

The overall findings show high transferability among Malays, with only very slight differences in the transferability levels of the main partners, PAS and Umno, to each other.

Transferability levels among Malays are slightly lower for the non-dominant component parties in PN and BN - such as MCA, MIC, and Wawasan - yet they are also high.

Where the variation is sharper is among the non-Malays, where traditional Chinese BN supporters did not vote for PAS.

This was not the case for Indians, however, who opted for PAS in high numbers as part of the big swing of Indians away from Pakatan Harapan in Negeri Sembilan.

BN traditional Indian supporters were less likely to support Wawasan, while Chinese supporters did so.

In many cases, the base of support expanded beyond 2022, reflecting gains through the partnership - a clear reason it is being repeated.

Anwar’s new frenemy Bersatu

Another feature of the deals involves a warming of ties between Bersatu and Harapan, with the coalition leaving some seats for Bersatu to have a better chance of making electoral gains, such as Bemban, where DAP made way for Bersatu to contest.

Bersatu is also contesting against Harapan in three seats (Kelebang, Ayer Keroh, and Pengkalan Batu), allowing the party to test its electoral strength on its own.

The party is hoping for Harapan electoral transferability to boost its chances in some key seats, along with the local standing of its candidates, such as former Malacca Umno deputy chairperson and Dewan Negara deputy president Mohamad Ali Mohamad contesting in Kelebang.

Bersatu has performed dismally in both Johor and Negeri Sembilan. In the latter, it contested 24 seats, lost almost all of its deposits and won only 2.6 percent of the vote.

Malacca was where PN made its Peninsular Malaysia debut in the 2021 state election, led then by Bersatu, and it is hoping that the state will give it another chance.

Parties seem to think voters forget, hoping that when parties reunite, all will be forgiven.

The Parliament confidence and supply agreement on the eve of Malacca polls between the Madani government and Bersatu, former Bersatu members, Muda, and independents, showcased the need for ‘reforms’ and ‘stability’ in rather farcical fashion given the reform momentum lost in 2020.

It was another prelude, a curtain-raiser that speaks of the primacy of survival mode for all of those involved. The sourness of sentiment over Harapan’s new frenemy Bersatu working with the Anwar-led coalition cannot be overstated.

While BN and PAS have a longstanding troubled relationship, Malacca is round three of forging ties.

For Bersatu, where agreements or allegiance to PH/BN governments in Pahang and Selangor have also recently been made, changing alliances in support of state governments, voter responses have not been tested.

On the ground, many Malaccans (and others elsewhere) are troubled, asking why Harapan would now work with a party that brought the house down on it in 2020, destroying the hopes of many Harapan supporters.

As in one of Shakespeare’s plays, everyone may end up paired off, but the ending may not be what voters are promised.

Bersama’s budding strength

Some of the voters uncomfortable with this sort of frenemy manoeuvring are turning to Bersama.

No question, the party led by former PKR deputy president Rafizi Ramli is gaining greater traction, especially among older voters who traditionally supported Harapan, and increasingly among younger voters disenchanted with all of the parties on offer.

Bersama’s test will be its vote share, whether it can break through in the competitive seats such as Bemban or Kelebang.

Its candidates have been working hard on the ground, all with strong roots and professional backgrounds, but they lack experience and the resource competitiveness of other parties.

Bersama continues to rely on a protest vote against the other traditional parties. In Johor, Bersama won three to six percent of the vote in the seats it contested and is poised for increased support.

They are looking for a Malacca surprise, hoping the state polls will give it electoral life, as it did for Bersatu in 2021 and PKR in 2013.

Bersama faces an uphill battle if the contest remains centred on local governance.

So far, Bersama has been the extra turn of a bangsawan, the act performed between the main scenes while the scenery changes. Malacca will show whether it can move from the interval to a more prominent role.

Malaysian politics has long shown that results cannot be scripted, however much work goes into the production.

Over a third of the seats remain highly competitive, including Ayer Keroh, Kelebang, Machap Jaya, Gadek, Bukit Katil, and Paya Rumput.

More details will be in my Kerusi Panas podcast episode on Malacca next week.

The bigger risk for every party is the audience; Malacca’s voters have seen this play before, with many of the same faces. The refrain of sama je (they’re all the same) is ever present with a real thread of cynicism.

Many may opt not to vote, to stay away from the show, especially those living outside the state, in an election that favours the incumbent Umno/BN coalition.

Turnout, transferability and resources will shape the results, as will whether the campaign will transform from a local production into a more heated national one.

For now, attention will focus on Malacca’s political theatre. Voters in Malacca have long sent clear political signals: they turned against BN in 2018, handing Harapan the state for the first time, and swung decisively back to BN in 2021.

Whatever the backstage preparations, what will matter are the reviews delivered at the ballot box. - Mkini

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BRIDGET WELSH is an honorary research associate of the University of Nottingham’s Asia Research Institute and a senior associate fellow at The Habibie Centre. Her writings can be found at bridgetwelsh.com. Her forthcoming book titled "Political Contestation in Modern Melaka" is expected to be published next year.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT