Blunders behind KL's retention pond fiasco

 

Predictably, the government then scrambled to quickly gazette the remaining 30 per cent of flood retention ponds and open spaces. - NSTP/ FAIZ ANUAR

THREE decades ago, the Federal Territories Ministry presciently anticipated that Kuala Lumpur and its city limits would face more severe flooding in the future.

In response, the government administration was moved to Putrajaya.

But the massive shift to Putrajaya prompted a dual, interconnected impact on floods. It alleviated floods inside the city centre, but accelerated the urban sprawl across the Klang Valley.

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To counter worsening floods, a high-tech drain was constructed — the SMART Tunnel was designed to be a great fix.

Alas, it was inadequate: torrential downpours have overwhelmed flood defences, inundating drainage systems and even flooding many Putrajaya precincts. Another major measure was put in place in 1998: 32ha of KL land was set aside as flood retention ponds.

But in later years, this prescient move was bogged down by bureaucratic inertia. How so? The authorities failed to gazette the land, permitting 70 per cent of protected plots to be alienated for mixed developments.

Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Federal Territories) Hannah Yeoh acknowledged that while the 32ha was approved on June 19, 1998, the gazettement was never initiated before land alienation.

It inadvertently created a "loophole" that allowed the land to be opened up for transfers and development approvals.

Yeoh's statement was backed by a Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) investigation, starting from 2021, into the alienation of six flood retention ponds.

The MACC investigation established no corruption, abuse of power or misappropriation.

In a nutshell, the prescience was replaced by pragmatism, the need to meet Kuala Lumpur's unstoppable growth. It boggles the mind that the easy governance of protecting earmarked land ready to be gazetted and shielding them from development pressure was blundered for 18 years.

It raises questions: how can land critical to public safety be left exposed for 18 years despite worsening flood risks? Why was there no automatic gazetting mechanism for critical flood infrastructure?

Why weren't red flags triggered when retention pond capacity kept shrinking? Since MACC dismissed malfeasance in how the land "vanished", it can only mean that the city authorities knowingly "weakened" its own dire flood defences.

Predictably, the government then scrambled to quickly gazette the remaining 30 per cent of flood retention ponds and open spaces.

Yes, the reaction is necessary and long overdue, but the authorities have to do better. The only consolation to this fiasco is that the nature of perennial floods is now better understood. - NST