The malaise that may yet sink Iran

Stagnation, humiliation, mismanagement, and sanctions continue to fuel anger that is sustaining a revolt against the Islamic Republic’s rulers.

Robin Wright’s Jan 13, 2026 New Yorker essay, “Iran’s regime is unsustainable”, is prescient not because it predicts an imminent collapse, but because it carefully dissects why the Islamic Republic has entered a phase of cumulative decay from which recovery is increasingly improbable.

Iran today is not merely experiencing another cycle of unrest; it is confronting a systemic crisis in which political repression, economic collapse, and ideological exhaustion are reinforcing one another across all layers of society.

At the heart of the current upheaval is a convergence of long-term structural failures and acute shocks.

Protests that erupted on Dec 28, 2025, were triggered when merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed their shops in response to the free fall of the rial. The symbolism was unmistakable.

Historically, the bazaar has been one of the regime’s most important social pillars, a constituency that helped sustain the 1979 revolution and later underpinned clerical authority.

When bazaaris strike, it is not merely an economic protest; it is a signal that the regime’s social coalition has fractured. This uprising did not emerge in isolation.

It is the latest in a long sequence of mass protests stretching back to 2009, through the Green Movement, the economic protests of 2017–2019, and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising of 2022.

What distinguishes the current wave is its geographical and social breadth. The value of the Iranian currency — the rial — has shrunk by almost 90% viz the US dollar.

Demonstrations have been reported in all 31 provinces, encompassing urban centres, provincial towns, ethnic peripheries, students, workers, merchants, and increasingly, elements of the middle class that once hoped for gradual reform.

More than 2,000 deaths and thousands of arrests since late December 2025 underscore the regime’s reliance on brute force as its primary instrument of survival.

The chants echoing across Iran — most notably “Death to the Dictator” — are revealing. They are not demands for policy reform, subsidy adjustments, or Cabinet reshuffles.

They express a deeper sense of betrayal and existential insecurity after nearly half a century of theocratic rule. For many Iranians, the regime no longer represents resistance, justice, or moral authority.

It represents stagnation, humiliation, and a narrowing of life choices in a country rich in human capital and natural resources but impoverished by mismanagement and sanctions.

One of the Islamic Republic’s gravest vulnerabilities, as Wright notes, is internal decay.

The regime has increasingly turned inward, arresting not only dissidents but also its own reformists — figures who once served as a safety valve by channeling popular frustration into controlled electoral politics.

The legitimacy of reformism was already badly damaged after the disputed 2009 presidential election, widely seen as fraudulent.

Since then, successive reformist promises have failed to deliver meaningful change, eroding public trust.

Sociologists such as Ali Kadivar and Charles Kurzman have highlighted this erosion of credibility.

The public no longer believes that gradualism within the system can produce accountability or economic relief. Reformists are increasingly perceived as either powerless or complicit, trapped within structures designed to neutralise them.

This leaves the regime with fewer intermediaries between state and society — and fewer options beyond repression.

Former British ambassador Rob Macaire has bluntly observed that Tehran appears to have run out of ideas.

There is no coherent economic strategy capable of stabilising the currency, attracting investment, or addressing inflation that has devastated household purchasing power.

Nor is there a political vision capable of reconciling a young, digitally connected population with a rigid, clerical elite that governs through fear rather than consent.

The regime’s security apparatus remains formidable but is not immune to these pressures.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and associated forces number in the hundreds of thousands and have shown a willingness to use lethal force. Yet repression on this scale is costly, not only morally but institutionally.

Rank-and-file soldiers and police officers share the same economic hardships as protesters: collapsing wages, rising food prices, and uncertain futures. Their loyalty, while strong at the top, is not infinitely elastic at the bottom.

Recent Israeli and US strikes on Iranian military and nuclear facilities have further complicated the regime’s calculus.

Beyond their material impact, these attacks have punctured the image of invulnerability cultivated by the state.

When combined with domestic unrest, external pressure can erode morale within security institutions, especially among mid-level commanders who must decide whether to escalate violence or hesitate.

History suggests that authoritarian collapses rarely begin with top-down defections; they occur when doubt spreads among those tasked with enforcing order.

Analysts have drawn comparisons to historical tipping points such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, where a regime that appeared stable suddenly unraveled once enforcement faltered. Iran is not East Germany, and analogies should not be overstretched.

Yet the underlying lesson remains relevant: regimes that rely almost exclusively on coercion eventually confront moments when fear is no longer sufficient to govern.

What makes the current crisis particularly dangerous is the absence of credible off-ramps. The leadership is divided, ideologically rigid, and aging.

Supreme authority is concentrated but lacks the charisma and revolutionary legitimacy that once sustained mass mobilisation.

Economic relief is constrained by sanctions and self-inflicted policy failures.

Political reform is viewed as an existential threat rather than a survival strategy.

Robin Wright’s central argument — that the regime is unsustainable — does not imply imminent collapse.

Authoritarian systems can endure longer than expected, especially when opposition is fragmented and external actors are cautious.

But sustainability is not measured in weeks or months; it is measured in whether a system can renew its legitimacy, adapt its institutions, and offer its population a plausible future.

On all three counts, the Islamic Republic is failing.

Iran today stands at a crossroads not of sudden revolution, but of prolonged instability.

The danger is not only what happens if the regime falls, but what happens if it does not — if repression deepens, the economy deteriorates further, and society fractures beyond repair.

In that sense, Wright is correct: the question is no longer whether the system is under strain, but how long it can continue governing against the will, welfare, and hopes of its own people. - FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.