Lengthening the road to peace

 Cambodia’s move to opt for international arbitration over dialogue to resolve its dispute with Thailand makes the process more rigid.

For Malaysia, which has long invested diplomatic capital in preserving Asean unity and regional stability, the latest developments between Thailand and Cambodia should be a cause for concern.

The decision by Cambodia to seek compulsory conciliation under the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) has altered the nature of the dispute between the two neighboring countries.

What was once a disagreement that could still be managed primarily through bilateral diplomacy has now entered the realm of international legal adjudication and structured third-party processes.

This does not mean conflict is inevitable. Nor does it mean that diplomatic engagement will cease.

But it does suggest that relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh are unlikely to improve significantly in the near future.

For decades, Asean has encouraged its members to settle disputes peacefully through dialogue, consultation, and consensus.

This approach has often been criticised as slow and cumbersome. Yet it has helped prevent disagreements from escalating into larger confrontations.

The preference for bilateral negotiations has been particularly strong among Asean member states because it allows governments to retain flexibility while avoiding the appearance of external interference.

Thailand has made its preference unmistakably clear.

Bangkok has repeatedly argued that bilateral negotiations should have been exhausted before Cambodia proceeded with compulsory conciliation under Unclos.

Thai officials believe direct talks provide room for compromise, practical arrangements, and confidence-building measures that formal legal processes may not easily accommodate.

From Thailand’s perspective, once a dispute enters an international legal mechanism, political maneuverability narrows considerably. Positions become more rigid.

Domestic audiences begin to interpret concessions as weaknesses.

Governments become increasingly constrained by legal arguments they have already presented before international bodies.

Cambodia, however, appears to have concluded that bilateral negotiations alone were insufficient to advance its claims.

By invoking Unclos procedures, Phnom Penh is signaling that it seeks a rules-based outcome anchored in international law rather than one dependent solely on political bargaining.

The result is a significant shift in the diplomatic landscape.

International legal proceedings rarely generate immediate reconciliation between disputing parties.

In many cases, they produce the opposite effect in the short term. Governments become more invested in defending their legal positions.

Nationalist sentiments often intensify. Media narratives become increasingly adversarial. Political leaders face pressure to demonstrate resolve rather than flexibility.

This dynamic is particularly sensitive in Southeast Asia, where questions of sovereignty, maritime boundaries, and territorial rights carry deep historical and emotional significance.

Malaysia understands these realities better than most countries.

As a maritime nation with extensive interests in the South China Sea, Malaysia has consistently supported international law while simultaneously emphasising the importance of diplomacy. Kuala Lumpur has long attempted to balance legal principles with practical engagement.

This dual approach reflects the understanding that legal victories alone do not necessarily create lasting political solutions.

The Thai-Cambodian dispute now risks becoming an example of this dilemma.

Even if the compulsory conciliation process proceeds smoothly, neither side is likely to emerge fully satisfied. International legal mechanisms often clarify claims but rarely eliminate political grievances.

Instead, they create frameworks within which future negotiations must occur. Consequently, Malaysia should not expect relations between Thailand and Cambodia to return quickly to normal.

The broader implications for Asean are equally important.

The association is already confronting a series of challenges. The prolonged crisis in Myanmar continues to test Asean’s credibility.

Major power rivalry between the United States and China remains intense. Supply chains are being reorganised amid geopolitical uncertainty.

The wars in Ukraine and West Asia continue to generate economic and strategic repercussions across the globe.

Against this backdrop, tensions between two mainland Southeast Asian neighbours represent an additional burden on regional cohesion.

Fortunately, Asean possesses institutional mechanisms that can help prevent deterioration.

Asean has accumulated decades of experience managing disagreements among its members.

While Asean may not directly intervene in the legal proceedings, it can continue encouraging dialogue, restraint, and confidence-building measures.

The role of Malaysia will be especially significant.

Having served as Asean chair in 2025 and continuing as coordinator for Asean-China relations, Malaysia remains one of the region’s most active diplomatic actors.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has consistently emphasised dialogue, mediation, and peaceful dispute settlement.

Kuala Lumpur therefore has every interest in ensuring that legal proceedings do not evolve into broader political estrangement between Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

At the same time, Malaysia must remain realistic.

Legal disputes are often measured in years rather than months.

The compulsory conciliation process under Unclos is designed to facilitate recommendations and dialogue, but it does not automatically generate political trust.

Trust must still be rebuilt through sustained engagement, economic cooperation, military-to-military communication, and people-to-people exchanges.

These elements cannot be supplied by legal institutions alone.

Indeed, one of the paradoxes of international law is that while it can clarify rights and obligations, it cannot by itself create goodwill.

That remains the responsibility of political leaders and diplomats.

For this reason, Malaysians should not assume that the current dispute will disappear once legal procedures begin.

On the contrary, relations between Thailand and Cambodia may experience periods of heightened tension as the process unfolds.

Public expectations, nationalist rhetoric, and domestic political calculations could all complicate efforts at reconciliation.

Yet there is also a reason for cautious optimism.

The fact that both countries are pursuing legal and diplomatic avenues rather than military confrontation demonstrates a continuing commitment to peaceful dispute resolution.

In a world increasingly marked by war and coercion, that commitment should not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, the reality remains clear.

Cambodia’s decision to internationalise aspects of the dispute through Unclos has fundamentally altered the trajectory of its relations with Thailand.

The dispute is no longer solely a matter for bilateral diplomacy. It has become part of a structured international legal process whose outcome will take time to emerge.

For Malaysia, therefore, prudence is essential. Asean’s two neighbours may eventually find common ground.

But expecting a rapid improvement in Thai-Cambodian relations would be unrealistic.

The path ahead will likely be long, legalistic, and politically sensitive.

The challenge for Asean is not merely to manage the dispute. It is to ensure that the dispute does not weaken the broader regional cohesion upon which Southeast Asia’s peace and prosperity continue to depend. - FMT

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.