Eighteen days after the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the first hours of the war, and eliminating other political and military leaders, it would have been safe to assume the power center of the Islamic Republic had been fatally destabilized.
"But as the third week of the war begins, it is becoming clear that this assessment does not match reality. Iran's power structure has overcome the initial shock," Middle East analyst Habib Hosseini‑Fard told DW.
Bruised but not eliminated, Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are continuing to carry out attacks on several fronts against the US, Israel and neighboring Arab states. They are relying on a decentralized and well‑connected command structure.
This seems to still be the case after Israel on Tuesday said it had killed Ali Larijani the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in Iran, which oversees coordination on defense and foreign policy. Israel also said the head of the Basij militia, Gholamreza Soleimani, was killed in another strike on Monday.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on Monday that Iran had launched more than 300 attacks on Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain over the last two weeks.
Saudi Arabia's Defense Ministry said on Monday that it had intercepted more than 60 drones in its airspace since midnight. This illustrates the unprecedented scale of the confrontation.
The United Arab Emirates also reported one death in Abu Dhabi and one injured person, which authorities said were caused by falling debris from Iranian projectiles.
Flexible command structures as a recipe for success
Against this backdrop, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has ruled out negotiations, saying there will be no cease-fire as long as the US and Israel continue to strike Iranian targets.
He appears able to rely on a still‑robust military apparatus, with the IRGC as the key actor capable of responding flexibly to constantly changing situations.
The IRGC was established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution because the new rulers distrusted the military built under the Shah. Its mandate was to prevent a coup and protect the state ideology.
Together with the regular army, the IRGC today forms Iran's armed forces and is subordinate to the religious and political leader of the Islamic Republic, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Its personnel strength is estimated at up to 200,000.
"Over the past two decades, the IRGC has evolved from a hierarchical institution into a networked structure," according to Middle East expert Habib Hosseinifard. "Provincial commands have extensive authority and can operate independently of the central command," he told DW.
Hosseinifard added that Iran's "strategic depth and underground missile silos also make it impossible to destroy its military capabilities in a short time — a reality that explains the continuation of the attacks despite US claims of maximum destruction."
The US and Israel have said some 15,000 targets in Iran have already been hit by airstrikes. Still, Iran manages to fire rocket attacks at Israeli cities. Early Tuesday, the US embassy in Baghdad was targeted by drone and rocket attacks. Gulf countries and shipping in the Persian Gulf have also been hit by strikes.
Why Iran can still fight as a 'failed state'
Reza Talebi, a political analyst, points to Iran's internal structure and warns against simplistic assumptions about a possible collapse of power in Iran.
"The notion that a period of state weakness or even a 'failed state' would automatically lead to the capitulation of military forces does not reflect the structural realities in Iran," Talebi said.
"Ideologically driven actors within the military and security apparatus are closely bound to the system's very existence."
Talebi stresses that the Revolutionary Guards are not merely a military organization.
"The Revolutionary Guards also control economic and ideological power structures that extend far beyond Iran," he said.
The includes the "Quds Force," a special unit of the IRGC responsible for operations abroad, and militant groups across the Middle East that support Iran's objectives, including the destruction of Israel.
And the organization also controls a construction conglomerate called Khatam‑al‑Anbia, which plays a leading role in numerous strategic infrastructure projects and multi‑billion‑dollar investments. The company was established in the late 1980s to rebuild the country after the war with Iraq.
"These organic interconnections make a rapid or voluntary relinquishing of power extremely difficult," said Talebi.
"If only the outer layer of the system is weakened, this does not necessarily lead to collapse; instead, it can heighten tensions and intensify internal conflicts within the power apparatus," he added.
Should the system collapse, he adds, a breakdown resembling Syria or Afghanistan would be more likely than an orderly transfer of power.
Complete collapse unlikely
Talebi therefore believes that "a fully collapsed security apparatus is not necessarily the objective" for the US and Israel.
From Israel's perspective, a weakened but still functioning security structure in Tehran could be more predictable than a total power vacuum.
According to Hosseini‑Fard, the US and Israel now appear to be pursuing weakening Iran's remaining military capacities and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while conducting targeted strikes on security institutions to facilitate internal protest.
However, a cease-fire in the near future and or a collapse of the Revolutionary Guards are both unlikely, Hosseini‑Fard said.
He noted that after the initial shock, Iran deliberately created uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz, increasing pressure on the global economy. And with attacks on infrastructure and military bases in the Gulf region, the regional dimensions of the conflict are expanding.
"The most likely scenario is a continuation of the war — either at its current level or in an expanded form," he said.
This article was originally published in German.
- Deutsche Welle

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