When Umno Youth chief Dr Akmal Saleh presented his ideas to his boss, Umno president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, he was probably looking for a big break in his political career.
Three days before the meeting with Zahid, Akmal organised an Umno Youth special convention, where the youth wing he leads called for its party to leave the government.
“Umno members are not cowards,” he said.
However, Akmal went further. He saw the split of Malay parties as a tragedy, and revived the grand dream of combining the two largest Malay parties, Umno and PAS, in the Muafakat Nasional tent.
This was opportunistic as PAS leaders now felt betrayed by Bersatu after the Perlis menteri besar crisis, where a coup resulted in the PAS menteri besar being replaced by a Bersatu leader.
Akmal even had the backing of PAS information chief Ahmad Fadhli Shaari, who wanted MN to be “immediately” launched after Umno leaves the coalition government.
Every Malay party leader has tried to unify the Malays (former Umno president Onn Jaafar’s Kongres Melayu, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah’s Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s “Kongres Maruah Melayu”, and the current prime minister’s Bumiputera Economic Congress).
The moves were made because they stoked a profound longing among Malays and would almost guarantee electoral dominance. Imagine the most prominent Malay-Muslim leaders seated together with a common Malay agenda.
And then imagine Akmal as the first proposer. If it worked this time, Akmal would have achieved a rare feat in Malaysian political history.
However, this was not meant to be.
Zahid did not seem convinced and urged his party not to “indulge in nostalgia”, and promised to stay with the coalition government for now.
He also said Umno does not want to be “bitten by the same snake a second time”.
PAS’ betrayal of Umno
In Malay culture, snakes are commonly used as imagery to describe a hidden betrayal that is close to you or two-faced behaviour.
For Zahid to use such a harsh description shows that Umno has not moved on from its perceived betrayal by PAS after they formed MN in 2019.
Notwithstanding the hype around the pact, it was a project that lasted for barely five months. It was not even a formal coalition; it was only a charter signed by both parties to champion Malay-Muslim issues.
Yet, Umno expected some degree of loyalty from PAS, and felt betrayed when PAS went on to form a formal political coalition with Bersatu. Even after five years, Zahid still doubts PAS’ sincerity and accuses them of abandoning the project.
Most political parties have the right to be cautious of PAS. The Islamic party has partnered with most major political parties, and almost all of them ended acrimoniously.
The only time PAS could work well with its partners was when the others were small, bordering on insignificant: Gerakan, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front (Berjasa), and Malaysia National Alliance Party (Ikatan).
Based on their coalition track records, there seem to be at least three reasons why it is hard for others to work with PAS.
Why PAS always abandons partners
First, PAS’ long-term thinking sees every partner as merely a tool. What cannot be taken away from PAS is that it has a clear long-term vision that has not changed since its founding in 1951.
PAS believes in a government and society that is led by Islamic leadership, with Islamic precepts and syariah law governing every aspect. While the zeal and gradient of this may vary through the decades, the long-term vision did not change.
Under PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang, this takes a more exclusivist tone of marginalising non-believers.
Another proof of PAS’ long-term vision is its launch of the “Wawasan Induk Negara Sejahtera 2051” that lays its grand vision of how Malaysia should be transformed at the party’s 100th year.
That is why it does not see coalition partnership the same way other parties do. It does not matter who they work with, as long as it serves them to get closer to the party’s long-term vision.
PAS used to hold on to the principle of “tahaluf siyasi” (or political pact) to justify working with BN (1974), Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (1990), Barisan Alternatif (1999), Pakatan Rakyat (2008).
It then changed to a new strategy called “ta’awun siyasi” (or political cooperation), which is a looser concept that allows it to work with as many parties as possible - even at the same time.
It was what helped justify a flexible partnership with arch-rival Umno, but still formed a political coalition with Bersatu. It was why this was perceived as a betrayal to Umno but was logical to PAS and its long-term vision.
‘Big brother’ tendency
Second, PAS has a “big brother” tendency that is growing by the election. When times are good, it would not take long before PAS shows how uncomfortable they are playing second fiddle.
In 1999, when it won 27 seats (from the previous seven seats) as part of Barisan Alternatif with DAP, Keadilan, and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), it became overzealous and started pursuing kharaj land tax on non-Muslims, mandating Muslim dress codes, banning gambling and restricting alcohol, and pushed for syariah enactments in Kelantan and Terengganu.
DAP left the pact. The current rift with Bersatu is similar, as PAS is not only the largest party in Parliament now, but has also made breakthroughs in Sabah and Negeri Sembilan to feel confident.
Even when times are bad, PAS has a track record of making unilateral decisions and violating coalition principles. Despite rejections by DAP and PKR, PAS insisted on implementing hudud when it was part of Pakatan Rakyat.
Similarly, Umno’s main grievance against PAS was that the Islamic party did not consult Umno before forming Perikatan Nasional, resulting in the severance of trust and the MN structure.
And this can be attributed to how PAS works. Its ulama leadership is the central authority. The veto authority of its ulama outweighs any coalition discussion.
It is hard for PAS to view its ulama as being subservient or even equal to other coalition partners. After all, any partnership is meant to serve PAS’ highest truth of governing the country with Islam. There could not be anything higher.
Third, PAS’ ideological stance will not shift. In its party constitution, 2003 Islamic State document, official speeches, and multiple peer-reviewed journals, it is unambiguous that PAS is intent on an Islamic state that runs on Islamic precepts and syariah laws.
The short diversion to use “negara berkebajikan” (welfare state) in 2011 was simply a matter of relabelling and sequencing (welfare first, to lead to an Islamic state).
Other parties are aware of this, but were still open to working with PAS because of what they bring. PAS has one of the most disciplined party machinery that could be mobilised in an instant.
Its 70-year grassroots infrastructure is mature, covering pre-schools to secondary schools, youth volunteering corps, and civil society. In a world where voters are split, a party that could deliver between 30 to 40 MP seats with certainty is a kingmaker.
By this time, every party knows what it is like to work with PAS. Yet, most parties are still tempted to consider, given PAS’ seemingly unstoppable electoral ascendency.
These parties will convince themselves that they could manage PAS’ behaviour and eventually come out on top. However, they should ask Bersatu how this turned out. - Mkini
JAMES CHAI is a visiting fellow at Iseas-Yusof Ishak Institute and the author of the bestselling book titled “Sang Kancil: A Tale of How Ordinary Malaysians Defied the Odds” (Penguin Random House). More of his writing can be found at jameschaiwriting.substack.com. He could be reached at jameschai.mpuk@gmail.com.
The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of MMKtT.
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