More than a scandal, corruption of security services is a security risk

History shows that states do not fall because their enemies are strong, but because corruption makes infiltration cheap.

From Atticus F

When corruption is discussed, it is usually framed as a problem of morality or governance, which is dangerously incomplete.

Corruption is not just about money, but also vulnerability. Once corruption enters uniforms and command structures in the security services, the military, police and intelligence agencies, the state itself becomes porous.

When the US moved decisively against Nicolás Maduro, what surprised many observers was not the politics, but the ease. Presidential security failed. Senior officers were compromised. Information clearly flowed from inside the system.

Operations like that do not succeed because foreign forces are magically brilliant. They succeed because the target’s own security apparatus has already been hollowed out.

Latin America has lived this reality for decades. Drug cartels did not defeat armies with firepower. They bought officers. They corrupted promotions. They compromised procurement and intelligence. Once senior figures were financially or politically compromised, loyalty became transactional. Infiltration became cheap. When pressure came, the system folded.

In Iran, several senior figures linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have been assassinated in highly targeted strikes. These were not random attacks. They required precise information, locations, routines, timing. That kind of intelligence does not come from satellites alone. It comes from people inside the system talking, facilitating, or looking away.

The rot within

This is not about culture or ideology. It is about institutional integrity.

Strong militaries are not defined by how much they spend, but by how difficult they are to penetrate from within. That is why the Israel Defense Forces treats corruption as a security threat, not an embarrassment. Failures are exposed early because secrecy, not transparency, is the real danger.

Now bring the lens home to Malaysia.

One of five corvettes in the littoral combat ship project under construction in Lumut, Perak. The first ship was launched in 2017.

Take the Littoral Combat Ship programme. Billions were spent. Years passed. Ships meant to strengthen naval readiness became symbols of paralysis. While paperwork moved, sailors trained without ships. Capability eroded. That was not merely a financial scandal, it was operational weakness.

Then consider our fighter aircraft history. Malaysia acquired MiG-29s and F/A-18 Hornets in roughly the same era. One platform was retired early, plagued by sustainment and support issues. The other, older on paper, remains operational today. Same air force. Same pilots. Very different outcomes.

That contrast tells us something uncomfortable: procurement decisions, when distorted by politics or opacity, determine whether a military can actually function or merely look impressive on parade day.

The Sukhoi Su-30MKM, purchased from Russia but deliberately integrated with Western avionics, reflects an attempt to hedge against opaque supply chains. Sensible — but also revealing. When procurement becomes politicised or compromised, even capable platforms turn into logistical burdens.

Corruption in the security sector rarely announces itself with explosions. It shows up as delays. As “temporary” workarounds. As grounded aircraft. As ships that never sail. As investigations quietly labelled “no further action”.

And that is where the real danger lies. Because once corruption reaches command structures, it creates infiltration points. Officers under financial or political pressure become leverage. Systems become predictable. Intelligence leaks. Outsiders do not need overwhelming force, they just need access.

Question reasons for NFA

This brings us to enforcement and why reform of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission and the police matters.

If corruption cases involving the military or police can be quietly stalled, neutralised, or marked “no further action” without explanation, the rot goes unchecked. Over time, institutions weaken not because their people are bad, but because silence is rewarded.

Revamping MACC is therefore not about giving it more power, nor about shifting it under Parliament or any other body for cosmetic independence. The real reform is simpler and more effective, making it impossible to quietly shut cases down.

When MACC closes a serious corruption case, especially involving the security services, that decision should be treated as an accountable public act. “No further action” should require recorded reasons. Prolonged inaction should be reviewable. Interference should force written explanations rather than whispered instructions.

Courts should be allowed to ask a narrow, essential question: why did this investigation stop?

This is where public interest litigation becomes critical. Corruption in the security sector is not a private grievance. It is a public risk. Citizens, civil society and affected parties must be able to challenge unexplained inaction not to force prosecutions but to force transparency.

Suing in public interest

At the moment, public interest litigation in Malaysia exists more in theory than in force. Courts recognise it but cautiously. Standing remains narrow, inaction is rarely scrutinised and anything that looks close to prosecutorial discretion makes judges understandably nervous.

The result is that such litigation can challenge bad decisions, but struggles to challenge silence – and in corruption cases, silence is often the problem. When investigations stall or are marked “no further action” without explanation, there is little practical recourse.

Until public interest litigation is expanded to allow courts to review the legality of inaction, without deciding guilt, it cannot function as a real safeguard against quiet burial of serious cases.

There is also an existing but underused safeguard, the magistrate. A magistrate already has power to direct investigation when a complaint discloses a seizable offence. This does not order charges. It simply ensures allegations are properly investigated and not buried. Used carefully, it acts as a pressure valve when institutions fall silent.

Finally, honest officers must be protected. Fixed tenure for key investigative posts, transparent transfer rules and real whistleblower protection are not anti-government measures. They are pro institution measures. Clean governments benefit from them the most.

Confirmation hearings

There is also a simple lesson from abroad on appointments. In the US, heads of the military, intelligence agencies and law-enforcement bodies are subjected to public confirmation hearings before specialised Senate committees.

Nominees are questioned openly about integrity, independence and past conduct, creating an on-record commitment that follows them into office. The system is not perfect, but it raises the cost of political capture by forcing scrutiny into the open.

Malaysia does not need to copy this wholesale but a limited form of parliamentary confirmation for key security and enforcement posts would strengthen credibility and make quiet, compromised appointments far harder.

Danger of doing nothing

The principle is simple: the most dangerous power in a security institution is not the power to act, but the power to do nothing without accountability.

Corruption in the security services is not a public relations problem or a moral lecture. It is a strategic risk. History shows that states do not fall because their enemies are strong, but because corruption makes infiltration cheap.

If Malaysia is serious about sovereignty, this issue must be confronted early, openly and structurally before weakness becomes visible to others.

Because when security fails, it rarely fails at the border. It fails quietly, from the inside. - FMT

Atticus F is an FMT reader.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.