Public spectacle or rule of law?

 Once images of raids and luxury assets circulate publicly, the accused may already suffer serious social, financial and psychological consequences regardless of whether charges are eventually filed.

From P Sundramoorthy

The recent pattern involving high-profile businessmen being dramatically arrested, offices and residences raided, assets scrutinised and allegations of money laundering or tax evasion widely publicised – only for some investigations to later end without prosecution – raises important criminological, legal and institutional questions.

These developments should not merely be viewed as isolated law enforcement operations, but as part of a broader tension between anti-corruption enforcement, elite power structures, political economy and public perceptions of justice.

From a criminological perspective, the issue can first be examined through the framework of “elite deviance” and “state-corporate crime”.

Elite deviance refers to harmful or unethical conduct committed by economically or politically powerful individuals who occupy positions of influence within society.

Importantly, criminology distinguishes between suspicion, allegation and proven criminality.

A person cannot automatically be labelled an “elite deviant” simply because they were investigated, their homes raided or they were arrested.

Nevertheless, repeated allegations involving offshore transactions, tax manipulation, regulatory loopholes or abuse of influence may still raise legitimate sociological concerns about how wealth and power interact with governance systems.

In many societies, elite deviance exists within a grey area between technically legal but ethically questionable practices and outright criminal conduct.

At the same time, criminological theory also cautions against assuming that all wealthy individuals investigated by enforcement agencies are necessarily guilty.

White-collar and financial crime investigations are exceptionally complex.

Money laundering, beneficial ownership concealment, tax engineering and cross-border financial flows frequently involve sophisticated corporate arrangements spanning multiple jurisdictions.

In some situations, dramatic raids and arrests may occur because investigators genuinely believe urgent intervention is necessary to secure evidence, prevent destruction of documents, freeze assets or demonstrate institutional seriousness.

Enforcement agencies may also publicise such operations to strengthen deterrence and reassure the public that influential individuals are not immune from scrutiny.

However, the public spectacle surrounding these operations creates another important criminological concern: reputational punishment without conviction.

Once images of raids, luxury assets and arrests circulate publicly, the accused may already suffer serious social, financial and psychological consequences regardless of whether charges are eventually filed.

This raises concerns regarding procedural justice, proportionality and the ethics of publicity-driven enforcement.

In criminology, this phenomenon is sometimes associated with “pre-trial social punishment”, where reputational damage effectively occurs before judicial determination.

The inconsistency in public communication by enforcement agencies further complicates the issue.

In some cases, public statements are issued clearly stating that an individual has been cleared of wrongdoing.

In many other cases, prolonged silence persists for years with no formal closure, prosecution or explanation.

Such inconsistency naturally generates speculation.

Some members of the public may suspect selective enforcement, political targeting, negotiated settlements, deferred prosecution arrangements or informal compromise mechanisms occurring behind closed doors.

Whether such suspicions are accurate or not, the lack of transparency itself becomes criminologically significant because public trust in enforcement institutions depends heavily on perceived fairness, consistency and accountability.

Selective enforcement is particularly damaging in societies where political and economic elites are perceived to possess unequal access to influence, legal resources and networks of protection.

Conflict criminology argues that law enforcement systems do not always operate neutrally; rather, they may sometimes reflect broader struggles between competing elite factions, political interests or economic groups.

Under such conditions, enforcement actions risk being interpreted not purely as crime control measures, but as instruments within wider contests for political or economic influence.

Even where agencies act lawfully and independently, inconsistent outcomes can still create perceptions of politicisation.

Another possible explanation is that many financial investigations fail to meet the exceptionally high evidentiary threshold required for prosecution.

Unlike conventional crimes, white-collar investigations often depend on forensic accounting, digital financial tracing, international cooperation and proof of criminal intent. Suspicion alone is insufficient.

Some cases may collapse because evidence is circumstantial, transactions are legally ambiguous or prosecutors determine that conviction prospects are weak.

This does not necessarily imply corruption or selective treatment, although the absence of transparent explanations allows alternative narratives to flourish.

Ultimately, the broader issue extends beyond individual businessmen or investigations.

The central criminological concern is institutional legitimacy.

Public confidence deteriorates when dramatic enforcement operations are highly visible but outcomes remain opaque, inconsistent or unresolved.

A mature rule-of-law system requires not only aggressive enforcement against genuine financial crime but also procedural fairness, transparency and equal treatment irrespective of wealth, political status or corporate influence.

Otherwise, society risks entering a dangerous environment where anti-corruption enforcement itself becomes viewed with suspicion, thereby weakening both deterrence and trust in governance institutions. - FMT

P Sundramoorthy is a criminologist at the Centre for Policy Research at Universiti Sains Malaysia. He is an FMT reader.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.