Malaysia’s addiction to consultants

 The pattern is unmistakable: when the state faces a complex problem, it hires a consultant instead of solving it.

From Kua Kia Soong

There is a quiet scandal at the heart of the Malaysian state. It does not explode like a corruption case. It does not provoke outrage like a price hike. It simply drains the country – year after year – of money, confidence, and the ability to govern. It is the outsourcing of thought.

I saw it most starkly when the government paid an international consultancy firm to produce the National Education Blueprint. Not to advise. Not to refine. But to think on behalf of the education ministry.

Over RM20 million later, we were handed a document that should have been written by the ministry itself. And that raises an unforgiving question: What exactly are our civil servants paid to do?

The great Malaysian brain drain

For decades, Malaysia has invested heavily in human capital. We have sent our brightest minds to the world’s elite institutions – University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, Harvard University, Stanford University – on public scholarships. These graduates populate our ministries, departments and agencies. The education ministry alone is filled with specialists, planners, and senior officials with decades of experience.

Yet, when the time came to craft a national vision for education, the state reached not inward, but outward. To a consultancy firm. At enormous cost. This is the replacement of public intellect with private foreign invoices. Who says people like myself and others are incapable of writing or contributing to the National Education Blueprint?

Malaysia spent RM7.2 billion on consultants

This episode was not an anomaly, it was a template. In a written parliamentary reply, the finance ministry disclosed that the government spent RM7.2 billion on private consultants between 2009 and 2013 – equivalent to about RM4 million a day. That figure should have triggered a national reckoning. Instead, it barely registered. How much has been spent on these consultants to the present day?

Where did this money go?

1. Digital systems that cost hundreds of millions, yet fail or require repeated “revamps” by – who else – more consultants.
2. Defence procurement planning, where external advisors proliferate even as capability gaps persist.
3. GLC restructuring exercises, packaged as “transformation programmes” but often little more than PowerPoint theatre with premium billing rates.
4. Economic blueprints and roadmaps, frequently authored by firms with minimal accountability once the report is delivered.

The pattern is unmistakable: when the state faces a complex problem, it hires a consultant instead of solving it.

The auditor-general’s quiet indictment

If one reads the reports of the auditor-general carefully, a damning picture emerges – not in a single explosive revelation, but in a steady accumulation of failures. Year after year, the same findings recur:

• Projects awarded with poorly defined scopes.
• Deliverables that are vague, duplicated, or unusable.
• Costs that balloon far beyond initial estimates.
• Ministries unable to demonstrate value for money.

Consultancy contracts sit comfortably within this ecosystem of weak accountability. After all, it is far easier to sign off on a report than to build internal capability. A report can be filed. A failure of governance cannot.

The myth of foreign expertise

Consultancies sell prestige. They sell the illusion that wisdom arrives with an international brand name. But what do they actually deliver? Frameworks. Benchmarks. Comparative charts. The same recycled vocabulary – “transformation”, “roadmap”, “key deliverables” – applied from one country to another with minimal sensitivity to context.

Education policy, in particular, is not a generic product. It is rooted in language politics, social inequality, rural-urban divides, and historical legacies. No consultant, however polished, understands Malaysian classrooms better than Malaysian educators. And yet, we paid millions to be told what we already knew – and then failed to implement it.

Consider the contrast with our southern neighbour, Singapore. In 1978, when Singapore undertook its landmark education reforms, it did not summon foreign consultants to draft its future. It relied on its own civil servants, educators, and internal expertise to produce what became known as the Goh Keng Swee Report.

I had my opinion of this Goh report, but the merit of this report aside, that decision mattered. Because policy-making is not just about producing documents. It is about building institutional confidence – the belief that the state can diagnose, think, and act. Singapore built that confidence. Malaysia outsourced it.

At its core, this is not a financial issue. RM20 million here, RM7.2 billion there – these are symptoms. The real problem is psychological. Somewhere along the way, the Malaysian state stopped believing in itself.

It began to assume that foreign consultants are inherently more credible; that internal expertise is inherently insufficient, and that legitimacy must be purchased, not earned. This is the mentality of dependency – dressed up in corporate language, justified by procurement procedures, and sustained by a lack of political will.

Who benefits?

Let us be blunt. Consultancy contracts are not just about expertise. They are also about networks, access, and influence. They create lucrative pipelines for global firms, opportunities for well-connected intermediaries, a revolving door between public office and private consultancy.

The Scorpene submarine scandal is a good example of such corruption. Meanwhile, the public pays twice: First, to educate and employ a capable civil service. Then, to bypass it.

Reclaiming the state

A serious government does not outsource its thinking. Consultants may have a role, but only at the margins, not at the core. They should support, not substitute, advise, not author. What Malaysia needs is not another consultant-led “transformation programme”, but a restoration of basic principles: ministries must be held accountable for producing their own policy frameworks; civil servants must be empowered, and expected, to think, not just implement; external consultants must be used sparingly, transparently, and with strict outcome metrics.

Governing is a responsibility, not a contract to be outsourced. Because if a government cannot think for itself, it will eventually be unable to act for its people. And when that happens, no consultant – no matter how expensive – will be able to save it. - FMT

Kua Kia Soong is a former MP and a former director of Suaram

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.