SOUTHERN THAILAND AGAIN

 First do watch this CNA report about southern Thailand.

For the past 35 years or so the issues in southern Thailand have become linked ever more closely to politicians across the border in Malaysia.  This issue has become more prominent with the politicians on our side AFTER the signing of the peace treaty between Malaysia and the Communist Party of Malay in  1989. 

Before the 1989 peace treaty there were still curfews along certain border areas especially at night. I knew friends from Gerik in Perak who spoke of night time curfews into the 1980s. Movements were restricted and the army and police in Malaysia were active along the border regions.  The constant presence of the Army and the Police Field Force also curbed other activities like smuggling, drug smuggling and human trafficking. 

But after the Hatyai Peace Agreement in 1989 all the security patrols, curfews and other security restrictions were lifted.  Thus the era of cross border smuggling, drug smuggling, poaching (into Taman Negara), human trafficking and even gun running began to take off.  There was also more people movement, business and trade across the border. And the religious preachers also began plying their trade. And other people also began taking advantage of the open frontier.

I took a screen grab from the video above and labelled the periods under the different Malaysian prime ministers.   

As you can see the death toll from the troubles in southern Thailand peaked during the period of Abdullah Badawi. Was this just a coincidence? The death toll levelled off in the early years of Najib and dropped in the second half of the Najib period. After the UMNO - BN lost power in 2018, it looks like southern Thailand has calmed down. Under Mahathir 2.0 and under the JUMBLED UP period the death toll has sort of stabilised.  

There is a real and historically deep Malaysian dimension to the southern Thai Malay question, particularly because Perlis, Kedah and Kelantan are linked by geography, kinship, religion, language and commerce to Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. 

Certainly the southern Thai separatist problem was NOT “created” by Malaysian politicians.   But it is not incorrect to say that latter day Malaysian political actors have repeatedly used, cultivated and sometimes institutionalised their influence across the border for domestic political, religious and strategic purposes.

The Malaysian political connection

The Thai-Malaysia border is exceptionally porous socially. Southern Thai Malays have long crossed into northern Malaysia for education, religious studies, employment, trade and family connections. These cross-border links are longstanding and southern Thai Malays have attended educational and religious institutions in Malaysia and worked in Malaysia's agricultural sector. Plus the many tom-yam joints in Kuala Lumpur.

The relationship to Malaysian politics became more interesting after the southern Thai insurgency developed. Malaysia became a safe environment, educational destination, employment market and political intermediary for many southern Thai Malays. Some separatist leaders spent years in Malaysia; several people associated with the separatist movement lived in exile, often for decades, in Malaysia. (About 25 years ago I ran into a couple of them who were working at an Islamic university here. Cant recall their faces or names but they were southern Thai separatists).  Malaysia subsequently became the venue and facilitator for peace negotiations beginning in 2013.

But Malaysia has failed quite miserably as a peace negotiator not only in southern Thailand but also in the southern Philippines. My strong advice is stay out of these conflicts. Malaysia does not have the competence to be a peace mediator. 

And human lives are involved. Look at that graph again. Thousands have died and are still dying in southern Thailand. So what peace mediator are you talking about? 

 In 2017 about 1,200 people were killed in Marawi City in Mindanao.  In 2013 there was that Sulu attack against Lahad Datu. Over a hundred people died. And the troubles are not over yet. So what peace mediation are you talking about?

Malaysia has just made a statement which tantamounts to saying that China can use force against Taiwan.  

I am jumping the gun. Post 1989 there was an enormous network of religious and political patronage crossing the Thai border - from Malaysia. PAS has historically cultivated Islamic educational networks, particularly in Kelantan, Kedah and the northern Malay heartland. 

Perlis provides an especially interesting example. Under various UMNO Menteri Besars Perlis has established substantial institutional links into southern Thailand. Fatoni University in southern Thailand was given a RM2.3 million building, scholarships and academic cooperation by MAIP. Perlis has also provided zakat assistance to a madrasah in Hat Yai attended by students from Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.  

That demonstrates the continuing cross-border religious patronage system, although it does not by itself demonstrate support for separatism. 

The political exploitation argument

For Malay politicians in Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis, the southern Thai Malay question can serve several purposes simultaneously:

• Islamic credentials: helping Muslim institutions across the border demonstrates commitment to the wider Malay-Muslim community.
• Malay nationalism: the existence of Malay Muslims suffering under a Buddhist-majority state reinforces narratives of Malay-Muslim solidarity.
• Electoral politics: politicians can portray themselves as defenders of Malays and Islam beyond Malaysia's territorial borders.
• Patronage: scholarships, religious institutions, mosques and educational networks create enduring personal and institutional relationships.
• Border influence: politicians acquire informal influence among communities and religious leaders immediately across the frontier.

The crucial distinction is therefore between welfare support for the southern Thai Malay Muslim community and support for the separatist movement in southern Thailand. The two are not the same. There is substantial evidence for the former - to help and aid the welfare of the Thai Malays. 

But it cannot be denied that Malaysia has provided a political environment in which separatist figures could operate, including hosting peace negotiations and accommodating exiled figures.

Malaysian Malay politicians did not create the southern Thai separatist problem, but they have repeatedly exploited the existence of that problem to strengthen Malay-Muslim political networks, religious influence and their own political legitimacy in Malaysia's northern border states.

For example there was an incident in 2005 (not reported in the local Press), the then Menteri Besar of Kelantan, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, had voiced concern for 131 Thai Muslims who had fled to Kelantan claiming they had felt threatened by the Thai military’s crackdown on Islamic insurgents. Demands by the Thai government to repatriate the group were met with responses from Malaysian leaders (namely then foreign Minister Syed Hamid and then Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak) seeking assurance that the human rights of the 131 would not be infringed before committing to returning them.

Thailand responded by summoning the Malaysian Ambassador in Bangkok to receive an official protest for “inappropriate remarks” that amounted to interference in Thailand’s internal affairs. While Malaysia eventually repatriated the Thai Muslims, the incident strained Malaysia-Thailand relations considerably and together with other similar incidents, has left an indelible mark on Malaysia’s approach to Thailand’s restive south.  (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies).

Then since the fall of UMNO-BN in 2018, a series of disruptive changes of governments and political instability  have weakened Malaysia’s ability to focus on foreign policy issues, let alone perform the role of a facilitator to peace efforts in southern Thailand. 

63 yrs of never ending UMNO rule facilitated the interference in southern Thailand and southern Philippines - for their own political purposes. But since 2018 no prime minister is assured of lasting more than one term. So Malaysia playing the intermediary has become quite meaningless. Why should Thailand, the Philippines, the Malay Muslims in Patani or the Moros in Mindanao hope towards Malaysia when there is no  political stability?  

Given Malaysia’s lengthy experience of failures as a peace negotiator it is better for Malaysia to mind our own business and learn to be a good, non-interfering neighbour to foster good relations with Thailand and the Philippines and avoid any strains in bilateral ties.

It is wrong to say that the unrest in southern Thailand has been a source of security and political concern for Malaysia. This is the furthest from the truth. It is the other way around. The proximity of the southern Thai insurgents to Malaysia has been a source of  security and political concern for Thailand.  

For example on 5th May 2017 a bomb hidden in a barrel exploded on the Thai side of the Golok River, injuring five Thai border police.  Thai authorities said the detonation wire was pulled from across the Golok River, from inside Malaysian territory.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.