Negeri Sembilan crisis: a test of constitutional method, not political loyalty

 The responsible path is institutional restraint: preserve records, publish legally permissible reasons, obey subsisting court orders, and let competent courts determine reviewable procedural questions.

From Azam Mohd

Negeri Sembilan’s royal dispute is ultimately a test of constitutional method, not loyalty. Labels such as “derhaka” or “coup” may mobilise supporters, but they cannot substitute for proving jurisdiction, procedure, and evidence.

The state constitution gives the undangs a distinctive role. The Attorney-General’s Chambers acknowledged on Sept 17 that the chieftains possess power concerning a Yang Dipertuan Besar’s removal, but said Article 10 imposes mandatory grounds and procedures.

It found no evidence establishing the specified disqualification grounds and regarded the April 19 proclamation as invalid. The opposing Secretariat of the Undang Yang Empat subsequently maintained that preliminary and further inquiries occurred on March 5 and April 19.

What is clearer is what the executive cannot do. The AGC stated that the menteri besar and executive council possess no unilateral authority to terminate or vacate the ruler’s office. The Dewan Keadilan dan Undang likewise says Article XVI places questions of Malay custom, including appointment and removal, within the Dewan’s jurisdiction.

The menteri besar’s signature presents a narrower question. Umno’s published position says Article 10(2) makes the signature part of implementing an undang’s decision, not the source of removal power. Yet whether a signature can validate an instrument depends first on satisfaction of the preceding constitutional requirements.

Ismail Lasim also alleged that an earlier signature was obtained under duress and lodged a police report. That allegation is evidence for investigation, not proof of criminal liability.

Judicial orders add another layer. On June 5, the Seremban High Court granted an ad interim injunction maintaining the existing composition of the Dewan Keadilan dan Undang and its secretary pending jurisdictional and justiciability questions or further order.

On July 8, the court granted leave for contempt proceedings against six individuals over an alleged breach; the Court of Appeal later stayed those contempt proceedings. Leave establishes a prima facie basis to proceed, not guilt.

Article XVI’s finality language concerning adat does not automatically erase judicial supervision over every procedural question.

Malaysian constitutionalism generally distinguishes the merits of an entrusted decision from whether the correct authority acted within constitutional limits.

Article 71 guarantees state constitutions and provides federal mechanisms in specified circumstances; Article 181 preserves rulers’ sovereignty subject to the Federal Constitution. Neither provision creates an ordinary shortcut for replacing Negeri Sembilan’s constitutional machinery. An emergency under Article 150 requires the constitutional conditions for a proclamation; controversy alone is insufficient.

Likewise, sedition, treason, offences against parliamentary democracy, arrest or disqualification require their own statutory elements and evidence. None follows automatically from disagreement.

The consequences nevertheless extend beyond Seremban. Melaka’s assembly was dissolved effective Sept 23, and its election must follow within 60 days. Barisan Nasional, Pakatan Harapan and Perikatan Nasional have incentives to frame Negeri Sembilan around loyalty, stability, and constitutional respect.

But there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the dispute will determine Melaka voting behaviour. Royal sentiment may influence some voters; household economics, candidates, turnout and coalition arrangements remain competing mechanisms.

For Umno and BN, the strategic danger is allowing legal ambiguity to become an identity test.

For PH and PN, exploiting unresolved proceedings as settled wrongdoing carries the same institutional risk.

The unity government’s interest should be narrower: preserve legal process, avoid executive improvisation, and ensure enforcement agencies act independently.

The evidence points to a dispute that remains legally conditional, not politically settled: Article 10 may empower the undang to remove the Yang Dipertuan Besar, but only if its mandatory grounds and procedures are satisfied; the menteri besar and executive council have no established unilateral power to do so; the validity of the April 19 proclamation remains contested; and any alleged breach of the High Court’s injunction is still for judicial determination.

Claims that criminal offences, disqualification, or federal intervention automatically follow are therefore premature, because each requires separate legal elements and proof.

That is why constitutional restraint, rather than partisan certainty, should define the response of every institution.

The responsible path is institutional restraint: preserve records, publish legally permissible reasons, obey subsisting court orders and let competent courts determine reviewable procedural questions while constitutionally designated adat bodies decide matters entrusted to them.

Negeri Sembilan does not need actors to manufacture a winner. It needs every institution to prove that constitutional authority still means authority exercised according to law. - FMT

Azam Mohd is an FMT reader.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of MMKtT.